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Abstract. We introduce a framework for a graph-theoretic analysis of the semantic para-
doxes. Similar frameworkshave been recently developed for inﬁnitary propositional languages
by Cook [5, 6] and Rabern, Rabern, and Macauley [16]. Our focus, however, will be on the
language of ﬁrst-order arithmetic augmented with a primitive truth predicate. Using Leitgeb’s
[14] notion of semantic dependence, we assign reference graphs (rfgs) to the sentences of
this language and deﬁne a notion of paradoxicality in terms of acceptable decorations of
rfgs with truth values. It is shown that this notion of paradoxicality coincides with that of
Kripke [13]. In order to track down the structural components of an rfg that are responsible
for paradoxicality, we show that any decoration can be obtained in a three-stage process:
ﬁrst, the rfg is unfolded into a tree, second, the tree is decorated with truth values (yielding a
dependence tree in the sense of Yablo [21]), and third, the decorated tree is re-collapsed onto
the rfg. We show that paradoxicality enters the picture only at stage three. Due to this we can
isolate two basic patterns necessary for paradoxicality. Moreover, we conjecture a solution
to the characterization problem for dangerous rfgs that amounts to the claim that basically
the Liar- and the Yablo graph are the only paradoxical rfgs. Furthermore, we develop signed
rfgs that allow us to distinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reference and obtain more
ﬁne-grained versions of our results for unsigned rfgs.
§1. Introduction. ‘Why are some sentences paradoxical while others are
not? Since Russell the universal answer has been: circularity, and more espe-
cially self-reference.’ These are the opening lines of Stephen Yablo’s article
‘Paradox without self-reference’ [22] that he concludes with the assertion
that self-reference is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for liar-like paradoxes,
drawing on the now famous example of an inﬁnite sequence of sentences
each of which says that all the sentences appearing later in the sequence are
not true.
In 1970, about two decades before Yablo’s discovery, Hans Herzberger
[10] already argued that there are referential patterns other than circular-
ity that should be counted as pathological. According to his approach,
any sentence has a domain, the set of objects it is about. Herzberger con-
cedes that ‘the general notion of a domain is more readily indicated than
explicated’. However, he gives the following rules of thumb. A sentence of
the form ‘A is (not) true’ is about A; a sentence of the form ‘All ϕs are
(not) true’ is about all the ϕs. Of course, some objects in the domain of
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a sentence may be sentences themselves. Those sentences, too, have their
own domain that may include sentences, and so forth. Let D(ϕ) be the
domain of the sentence ϕ and D2(ϕ) the union of the domains of all
sentences in D(ϕ). In this way, Dk(ϕ) can be deﬁned for all natural num-
bers k. (This hinges of course on the assumption that we have a deﬁnition
of ‘domain’.) Herzberger calls a sentences ϕ groundless iﬀ for all k, Dk(ϕ)
is not empty. According to this picture, both the liar and Yablo’s paradox
are groundless; but while the liar is about itself, hence circular, no member
of the Yablo sequence refers (directly or indirectly) to itself. Not all ground-
less sentences give rise to actual antinomies (the nonparadoxical truth-teller
sentence is clearly groundless, for example), but they all suﬀer from ‘vicious
semantic regress’, a form of ‘semantic pathology’ more general than merely
involving a vicious circle, which, according to Herzberger, is responsible
for the fact that groundless sentences ‘lose their comprehensibility’. Thus,
actual contradiction is ‘but the extreme symptom of semantic pathology’
([10, pp. 149–150]).
Yablo did not answer the question ‘Why are some sentences paradoxical
while others are not?’; but the idea that each sentence has a domain invites
the following crude answer:
Some sentences are paradoxical because of their position in the reference
graph of our language, i.e., in the directed graph whose vertices are the
sentences of the language, where two sentences φ, are connected by
an arc from ϕ to  iﬀ ϕ is about (refers to, depends on) .
Let us have a look at some informal examples. The paradigms of a self-
referential statement are the liar and the truth-teller and it is plausible to
represent their reference patterns by simple loops. In order to distinguish
them, wemight assign a ‘−’ to the liar and a ‘+’ to the truth-teller, indicating
that the liar makes a negative statement about itself whereas the truth-teller
makes a positive statement about itself.
L: (L) is false T : (T ) is true
L
−
T
+
We can also consider pairs of sentences that, even if they are not directly
self-referential, still exhibit some kind of circularity:
L1: (L2) is false L2: (L1) is true
L1 L2
+
−
Similarily, for every natural number n, we can consider liar cycles of
length n. A slightly diﬀerent example is given by a version of Curry’s
paradox:
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C1: (C1) is false or (C2) is true C2 : 1 + 1 = 3
C1 C2
+
−
It is clear that self-reference or circularity is not a suﬃcient condition
for paradox. But is self-reference or circularity a necessary condition for
paradox? According to Yablo [22] that’s not the case. Consider Yablo’s
paradox:
Y1: (Yn) is false for all n > 1,
Y2: (Yn) is false for all n > 2,
Y3: (Yn) is false for all n > 3,
Y4: (Yn) is false for all n > 4,
...
Informally still, wemay represent the Yablo sequence by the following graph
which does not contain any cycles.
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4
...
In the above picture, every arc should be assigned a ‘−’. Variations on the
Yablo sequence deliver new paradoxes whose reference graphs do not con-
tain any loops.
Y ′1: (Y
′
2) is true,
Y ′2: (Y
′
3) is false and for all even n > 2, (Y
′
n) is false,
Y ′3: (Y
′
4) is true,
Y ′4: (Y
′
5) is false and for all even n > 4, (Y
′
n) are false,
Y ′5: (Y
′
6) is true,
...
Y ′1 Y
′
2 Y
′
3 Y
′
4 Y
′
5 Y
′
6
...+ − + − + −
−
−
−
This raises the question of how many types of paradox there are and what
reference patterns underlie them. What are the ‘paradoxical nodes’ of the
reference graph? And can they be characterized in graph-theoretic terms?
We shall call any approach to semantic paradoxes that is concerned with
identifying paradoxical reference patterns aHerzbergerianor reference-based
theory of semantic paradoxes. In order to develop such an account we have
to (i) give a rigorous deﬁnition of the aboutness (reference, dependence)
relation, (ii) give a rigorous deﬁnition of (potential) paradoxicality, and (iii)
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name a class of graph-theoretic properties that specify which nodes in the
reference graph are (potentially) paradoxical.
1.1. Outline of the article. There have been several quite interesting
approaches to characterize the notion of a paradoxical sentence for inﬁni-
tary propositional languages using (unsigned) reference graphs (i.e., graphs
that do not distinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reference). Wemen-
tion here in particular the work of Cook [5, 6] and, more recently, Rabern,
Rabern, andMacauley [16].1 Our goal is to extend theirwork in several ways:
ﬁrst, to develop reference graphs (rfgs) for ﬁrst-order languages; second, to
develop new tools for investigating paradoxical reference patterns; third, to
develop the notion of a signed rfg. For deﬁniteness, our study will focus
on the language of arithmetic augmented with a primitive truth predicate.
However, nothing essential hinges on the details of this language and we
could have chosen any other interpreted ﬁrst-order language that contains
names and predicates applying to its own expressions as well. Choosing the
language of arithmetic is convenient in so far as (i) it contains (via coding)
a theory of its own syntax, and (ii) it is commonly used in the literature on
formal theories of truth.
Propositional languages oﬀer a straightforward way of deﬁning rfgs in
terms of the syntactic constituents of a sentence: φ refers to  iﬀ φ contains
a name of  within the scope of the truth predicate. This method no longer
yields satisfactory results when we move to ﬁrst-order languages. Instead,
wewill utilize Leitgeb’s [14] notion of semantic dependence for that purpose:
we assign rfgs to sentences in such a way that every node depends on the
set of all its out-neighbours. An rfg can be decorated with truth values.
A decoration is acceptable iﬀ it assigns to each node (sentence) a value that
is identical with its truth value relative to the Leitgeb valuation scheme VL
(given truth values for its out-neighbours). VL piggybacks on the notion
of dependence and can be treated in the general framework of Kripke [13].
We call a sentence referentially paradoxical iﬀ it has no rfg that admits
an acceptable decoration, and show that this is exactly the case if it has
no truth value in any Kripke ﬁxed point of VL. The notion of referential
paradoxicality bears some resemblance toYablo’s [21] notionof dependence-
paradoxicality. A major diﬀerence, however, is that Yablo does not provide
a concept of a reference graph, but only that of a dependence tree, which
corresponds rather to a decorated unfolding of an rfg than to the rfg itself.
In Section 3 we will introduce a game-theoretic approach as a new tool of
relating the reference pattern of a sentence to its paradoxicality. The major
motivation for this is that we want track down the structural components of
an rfg that are responsible for paradoxicality. We show that any decoration
can be obtained in a three-stage process: ﬁrst, the rfg is unfolded into a
tree, second, the tree is decorated (yielding a dependence tree in the sense of
Yablo [21]), and third, the decorated tree is re-collapsed onto the rfg. The
concept of the veriﬁcation game allows us to comprehend this three-stage
1Further notable work in this area includes Bolander [3], Dyrkolbotn and Walicki [8],
Gaifman [9], and Walicki [19].
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process as a game of perfect information between two players being played
on the rfg.
In Section 4 we show that paradoxicality enters the picture only at stage
three. Due to this we can isolate two basic patterns necessary for paradox-
icality: the cycle and the so-called double path. In order to achieve these
results (and many of those of Section 5) we develop the dichotomy between
the core and the periphery of an rfg. We show that a reference pattern is only
dangerous if it is located in the core. We also conjecture a solution to the
characterization problem for dangerous rfgs that amounts to the claim that
basically the Liar- and the Yablo graph are the only paradoxical rfgs.
In Section 5 we provide a more reﬁned notion of reference that allows
to distinguish, e.g., between the reference graph of the liar and that of the
truth-teller. To this end we label the arcs of a large class of rfgs by ‘+’ or
by ‘−’ depending on the syntactic structure of the nodes. Reﬁned versions
of our previous results are obtained: cycle as well as a double paths are
dangerous only if they contain an odd number of negative arcs.
For reasons of space, the following interesting questions cannot be treated
in the present article: are the methods and tools developed here applicable to
Rabern et al.’s and Cook’s framework? Can their notion of paradoxicality
be interpreted in terms of a Kripke ﬁxed point construction? Is there an
analogon to our veriﬁcation game that can be played on their graphs?, etc.
In future work we will show that the answer to all of these questions is
aﬃrmative. In some sense, the frameworks of Rabern et al. and Cook can
be embedded into ours. Key to this is the observation that their reference
graphs can be deﬁned in terms of a notion of dependence that corresponds
to the Weak Kleene scheme (for inﬁnitary propositional languages) in a
similar sense as Leitgeb’s notion of dependence corresponds to VL.
1.2. Technical preliminaries. A directed graph consists of a set V (G), the
vertices (or nodes) ofG , and of a setA(G) of ordered pairs of vertices, called
arcs of G . Throughout this article, we will use the shorter ‘graph’ instead of
‘directed graph’, except for Appendix A. There we will also discuss about
undirected graphs and therefore call directed graphs explicitly ‘digraphs’. If
x, y ∈ V (G) we denote an arc from x to y by (x, y); we call x its tail and y
its head. For any vertex x, we call y an out-neighbour of x iﬀ (x, y) ∈ A(G)
and an in-neighbour iﬀ (y, x) ∈ A(G). A graph H is a subgraph of G iﬀ
V (H ) ⊆ V (G) and A(H ) ⊆ A(G). In this case we also say that G contains
H and write H ⊆ G .
A nonempty graph P (i.e., a graph with at least one vertex) is called a
path (from a to b, of length n−1) iﬀ there is an enumeration (v0, v1, . . . , vn)
of V (P) such that for all 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n (vi , vj) ∈ A(P) iﬀ j = i + 1 with
a = v0 and b = vn. Note that a graph with one vertex and no arcs is a path
of length 0. We call such a path trivial. A graph C is called a cycle (of length
n+1) iﬀ there is a (possibly trivial) path P of length n from a to b such that
V (C ) = V (P) and A(C ) = A(P) ∪ {(b, a)}. A cycle of length 1 is called
a loop.
For any graph G , call an inﬁnite sequence of vertices (v0, v1, . . .) of V (G)
an inﬁnite walk in G iﬀ for all i ∈ (vi , vi+1) ∈ A(G). Analogously we can
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deﬁne a ﬁnite walk. Note that a path must be itself a graph while a walk
need not. Hence, one and the same vertex may occur more than once in a
walk, while the sequence enumerating the vertices of a path P contains every
vertex of P only once. A graph G is called well-founded iﬀ there is no inﬁnite
walk in G .
We call a graph H a subdivision of G iﬀ H is the result of replacing each
(x, y) ∈ A(G) by some path from x to y (possibly of length 1). A graph H
is an induced subgraph of a graph G iﬀ H is a subgraph of G and each arc
of G between two vertices of H is also an arc ofH .
A graph G is an accessible pointed graph iﬀ G has a distinguished node,
called its root, and every node of G is accessible from its root. Here, ‘y is
accessible from x’ means that y can be reached in a ﬁnite walk starting from
x, i.e., there is a sequence (z1, . . . , zn) of nodes such that z1 = x, zn = y and
for each 1 ≤ i < n there is an arc of G from xi to xi+1.
A tree T is a set of ﬁnite sequences (over some domain of objects) that is
closed under initial segments, i.e., such that for all s ∈ T , if t ⊆ s then t ∈ T .
We will refer to the elements of the tree (the sequences) as positions of the
tree. If s is a position of T , the set of T -children of s is the set {b | s ◦b ∈ T},
where s ◦ b denotes the result of extending the sequence s with the object a.
If a is the last element of s , we will sometimes (by slight abuse of language)
refer to the set {b | s ◦ b ∈ T} as the T -children of a. A position s of T is
a root of T iﬀ s has length 1. If s is a root, say s = (a), we will (by slight
abuse of language) also refer to the object a as a root of T . In this article,
we will mostly be concerned with trees that have a unique root. A branch
of a tree T is a subset of T that is linearly ordered by ⊆ and closed under
initial segments.
The object of our study is the ﬁrst-order language of Peano arithmetic
augmented with a primitive unary predicate symbol T . We denote the set of
its sentences byLT .We ﬁx some coding ofLT into; for technical simplicity,
we assume it is a bijection, but nothing substantial hinges on that. We will
frequently identify sentences with their codes. The language ofLT contains a
name for each sentenceϕ—i.e., the numeral of (the code of)ϕ—that we shall
denote by ϕ. If ϕ is a sentence and S ⊆ LT (i.e., S ⊆ ), we let ValS(ϕ)
denote the truth value of ϕ in the classical interpretation (N, S), where N is
the standard model of arithmetic and S is the extension (interpretation) of
the truth predicate T . We also write (N, S) |= φ to indicate that φ is true in
the model (N, S). Throughout this article, |= always refers to the classical
satisfaction relation.
§2. Reference graphs for first-order languages. In the introduction, we
have assigned rfgs to several paradoxical sentences relying merely on our
intuitions about their referential relations.2 In order to give a rigorous
graph-theoretic analysis of the semantic paradoxes we need, of course,
a systematic way of assigning an rfg to every sentence of our language.
2These intuitions, of course, shall prove to be accurate: According to the formal deﬁnition
given in Section 2.5, each of the graphs depicted in the introduction is the canonical rfg
(of the LT -formalization) of the corresponding sentence.
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In order to do so, we need a precise deﬁnition of what we may call, follow-
ing Herzberger [10], the domain of a sentence, i.e., the set of sentences that
a given sentence is about (refers to, depends on). Propositional languages
oﬀer a simple way of doing that: φ refers to  iﬀ there is a name α of  such
that ‘α is true’ is a subformula of φ. A straightforward way to generalize
this is to regard a quantiﬁed sentence as referring to all the sentences that
its instances are referring to (amounting roughly to a Weak Kleene refer-
ence relation). We ﬁnd this unsatisfactory, however. For example, we would
like to say that a sentence of the form ∀x(φ(x) → Tx) refers to all and
only the objects satisfying the predicate φ(x). Under the current suggestion,
the sentence would instead refer to every sentence. One reason why this is
unfortunate is that in ﬁrst-order languages, liar-like sentences often involve
(restricted) quantiﬁers, e.g., ∃x(diag(x) ∧ ¬Tx), where diag(x) indicates
that x is obtained from some diagonalization operation, or ‘There is one and
only one sentence written on the blackboard of room 104 and that sentence
is false’ (to take a natural language example). Clearly, we do not want to
say that such sentences refer to all sentences of the language. Therefore, our
proposal is to identify domains of sentences with dependence sets in the
sense of Leitgeb [14], which seem more well-suited for that purpose.3 Rfgs
can then be deﬁned in a straightforward way: the set of out-neighbours of
a node φ must constitute a dependence set for φ. However, some sentences
don’t have a canonical dependence set, and accordingly many sentence will
be assigned a set of rfgs. Based on Leitgeb’s notion of semantic dependence,
we will introduce a valuation scheme (called the Leitgeb valuation scheme,
VL) in terms of which we will deﬁne the notion of an acceptable decoration
of an rfg. Then, generalizing onRabern et al. [16], we will say that a sentence
φ is paradoxical if and only if there is no rfg of φ that admits an acceptable
decoration (where the quantiﬁer in the deﬁnition takes care of the fact that
φ might have several rfgs). As we will see later, our notion of paradoxicality
coincides (extensionally) with that of Kripke [13] with respect to the Leitgeb
valuation scheme. Therefore, we will start by reviewing Kripke’s theory of
truth. (This section also introduces two notions that are not found in [13]:
that of a standard valuation scheme and that of a hypodoxical sentence.)
Moreover, our notion of an rfg bears a close relationship to Yablo’s notion
of a dependence tree, which was introduced in Yablo [21]. Namely, depen-
dence trees can be viewed as unfoldings of decorated rfgs. Hence, Yablo’s
work will be brieﬂy reviewed in Section 2.2.
2.1. Kripke (1975). We assume that the reader is familiar with Kripke’s
ﬁxed-point theory of truth and use this section only to ﬁx some terminology.
A partial model is an ordered pair S = (S+, S−) such that S+, S− ⊆ LT
(encoded as a set of natural numbers) and S+ ∩ S− = ∅. Thus, in this
article, a partial model is always a consistent partial model. A valuation
3Admittedly, Leitgeb’s notion of dependence is more well-suited for that purpose, but
not perfect either. While it accords with many intuitions that we have about dependence, it
violates a few. (More on that below.) The question how to ﬁx these issues must be left open
for future research.
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scheme is a function V mapping pairs consisting of partial models and
sentences to the set {0, 1, 12}. A valuation scheme is monotonic iﬀ for all
partial models (S+, S−) ⊆ (P+, P−)4 we have: whenever V (S+, S−)(φ) =
v ∈ {0, 1} then V (P+, P−)(φ) = v. Examples of such schemes include the
Weak and Strong Kleene schemes, VWK and VSK . Let us call V classically
sound iﬀ for all partial models (S+, S−) and all sentences ϕ the following
holds: ifV (S+, S−)(ϕ) ∈ {0, 1}, thenV (S+, S−)(ϕ) =ValS+(ϕ). That is, a
valuation scheme is classically sound if every sentence that receives a deﬁnite
truth value under some partial model (S+, S−) receives the same truth value
in its classical close-oﬀ or closure, (N, S+). Let us call a valuation scheme
V standard iﬀ it is (i) monotonic, (ii) classically sound, and (iii) whenever
VWK (S+, S−)(ϕ) = v ∈ {0, 1} then V (S+, S−)(ϕ) = v. The last condition
is a nontriviality condition, implying that any standard valuation scheme
is at least as strong as the Weak Kleene valuation scheme. The notion of a
standard valuation scheme is adapted from Herzberger [11] and will play an
important role later on. Obviously, the Weak and Strong Kleene valuation
schemes are standard.Wewill later show (Section4.2) that there is amaximal
standard valuation scheme.
Let V be some standard valuation scheme. Given a partial model
(S+, S−), the Kripke-jump JV (S+, S−) is the partial model deﬁned by
({ϕ |V (S+, S−)(ϕ) = 1}, {ϕ |V (S+, S−)(ϕ) = 0}).
A partial model (S+, S−) is sound iﬀ (S+, S−) ⊆ JV (S+, S−). For any
sound (X+, X−) there is a ﬁxed point containing it, which can be obtained
from (X+, X−) by iterating the jump operator JV . Kripke calls a sentence
φ grounded (with respect to V ) iﬀ it is contained in the least ﬁxed point
of JV , and ungrounded otherwise. A sentence is called Kripke-paradoxical
(w.r.t. V ) iﬀ there is no ﬁxed point (of JV ) in which it receives a deﬁnite
truth value. Moreover, adapting a notion by Rabern et al. [16], we say that
a sentence φ is Kripke-hypodoxical (w.r.t. V ) iﬀ there are two ﬁxed points
of JV such that ϕ has one deﬁnite truth value in the ﬁrst and a diﬀerent
deﬁnite truth value in the second. Kripke calls a ﬁxed point intrinsic iﬀ no
sentence has a deﬁnite truth value in it conﬂicting with its truth value in any
other ﬁxed point. A sentence has an intrinsic truth value iﬀ it has a deﬁnite
truth value in some intrinsic ﬁxed point. The set of all sentences having an
intrinsic truth value forms a ﬁxed point, the largest intrinsic ﬁxed point.
Proposition 2.1 (Kripke). A sentence is Kripke-paradoxical or Kripke-
hypo-doxical iﬀ it receives no deﬁnite truth value in the largest intrinsic ﬁxed
point.
2.2. Yablo (1982). Yablo [21] complements Kripke’s ‘bottom-up’
approach by a ‘top-down one’: instead of checking whether a sentence ϕ is
grounded by iterating the Kripke-jump operator and then checking whether
it is in this ﬁxed point, we start with ϕ and work our way down, applying
an operation that could be called a reverse Kripke-jump. Let us make this a
bit more precise.
4That is, if S+ ⊆ P+ and S− ⊆ P−.
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A fact is an ordered pair (φ, v) consisting of a sentence φ and a truth value
v that can be either 0 or 1. IfF is a set of facts, we letF+ := {ϕ | (ϕ, 1) ∈ F}
and F− := {ϕ | (ϕ, 0) ∈ F}. If F+ ∩ F− = ∅, we say that F is consistent.
A consistent set of facts F can be viewed as a partial model (F+,F−)
encoded as a single set. Conversely, every partial model determines a unique
set of facts (in the obvious way). We will frequently identify consistent sets
of facts and partial models. We say, for instance, that F is a sound set of
facts, meaning that F considered as the partial model (F+,F−) is sound
in the sense of Kripke. If V (F+,F−)(φ) = v ∈ {0, 1}, we say that (φ, v)
is jump-entailed by F (because φ will have value v in the Kripke-jump of
(F+,F−)).
A fact-dependence tree (relative toV ) is a treeT such that (i) every position
s of T is a sequence of facts and (ii) for every position s of T , if (φ, v) is
the last element of s , then (φ, v) is jump-entailed (w.r.t. V ) by the set of
T -children of s . A fact-dependence tree for (φ, v) is a dependence tree with
(φ, v) as its root.5
A reverse Kripke-jump consists in the transition from a fact to a set of
facts that jump-entails it. Hence, starting with a fact, one can successively
generate a fact-dependence tree for it by iterated applications of reverse
Kripke-jumps. Of course, since in general there is more than one suﬃciency
set for a fact, reverse Kripke-jumps are not unique, but there is rather
a family of reverse Kripke-jumps, one among whose members we have
to choose. Consequently, a fact may have inﬁnitely many fact-dependence
trees.
Theorem 2.2 (Yablo). A sentence ϕ is grounded (in the sense of Kripke)
iﬀ either (ϕ, 0) or (ϕ, 1) has a well-founded fact-dependence tree.
According to Yablo [21], the paradoxicality of a sentence lies in the fact that
‘when we unravel and chase down the sentences truth or falsity conditions,
we are led to something absurd. And absurd here can only mean one of two
things: either we are led to call a true (false) sentence false (true) (as when,
for example, we choose to deny that Epimenides was really a Cretan), or
we are led to maintain of a sentence that it is both true and false (as when
we concede Epimenides nationality and elect to wrestle with the resulting
self-dependency of his utterance).’ In other words, we reach paradox iﬀ we
are led to assign truth values to sentences that are unfaithful to the facts or
inconsistent.
Yablo tries to capture this intuition by the following deﬁnition. A fact
(ϕ, v) is called unfaithful iﬀ ϕ receives the truth value 1 − v in the least
ﬁxed point, while two facts of the form (, 0), (, 1) are called opposite.
Yablo deﬁnes ϕ to be dependence-paradoxical iﬀ every fact-dependence tree
of (ϕ, 0) as well as every fact-dependence tree for (ϕ, 1) contains either an
unfaithful fact or contains two opposite facts. He proves the following result:
5Actually, Yablo calls such trees simply ‘dependence trees’, but since we are going to
introduce dependence trees later on whose nodes are simply sentences, instead of facts, we
call them ‘fact-dependence trees’.
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Theorem 2.3 (Yablo). Asentence is dependence-paradoxical iﬀ it isKripke-
paradoxical.
Wewill work with a modiﬁed deﬁnition of unfaithfulness which, in our view,
squares better with the picture invoked in the above quote. There might
be facts that are compatible with the least ﬁxed point (and thus faithful
according to Yablo’s deﬁnition) but which nevertheless lead inevitably to
other facts which are not, when we ‘unravel and chase down their truth
or falsity conditions’. In some sense, such a fact would be faithful but not
hereditarily faithful.6
Definition 2.4. A fact-dependence treeT is faithful iﬀ for all leaves (ϕ, v)
of T , v = 1 iﬀ (N, ∅) |= ϕ, where a node of T is a leaf iﬀ it has no children in
T (that is the case when it is jump-entailed by the empty set). A fact (ϕ, v)
is faithful iﬀ there is a faithful fact-dependence tree with root (ϕ, v). A set
of facts is faithful iﬀ each of its members is a faithful fact.
Theorem 2.3 remains valid even with our version of ‘unfaithful’. Our
Theorem 3.9 can be regarded as a reformulation of 2.3. In Section 2.5,
we will introduce the notion of a dependence tree, i.e., a tree whose nodes
are sentences. To that end, we will focus on valuation schemes such that,
whenever we decorate a dependence tree with truth values, the resulting tree
will be a fact-dependence tree. This will be the case wheneverV is symmetric
(cf. Section 2.6).
2.3. Leitgeb (2005). Yablo’s notion of fact-dependence aswell asKripke’s
notion of groundedness are somewhat parasitic on the notion of truth (i.e.,
on the Kripkean ﬁxed point models for truth). In [14], Leitgeb gives a
deﬁnition of groundedness that doesn’t depend on the notion of (grounded)
truth. He deﬁnes a relation of semantic dependence between sentences and
sets of sentences as follows:
Definition 2.5. A sentence ϕ depends on Φ ⊆ LT iﬀ for all Ψ ⊆ LT :
ValΨ (ϕ) = ValΦ∩Ψ (ϕ).
Thus, a sentence φ depends on a set of sentences Φ (encoded as a subset
of ) iﬀ all sentences that are relevant for the evaluation of φ are among
the Φs. Note that every sentence depends on . Leitgeb’s notion of depen-
dence has some neat properties: (1) Every T -free sentence depends on ∅.
(2) A sentence of the form Tφ depends on {φ}. (3) φ depends on Φ iﬀ
¬φ depends on Φ. (4) If φ, depend on Φ, then so do all truth-functional
compositions of φ,. (5) If for every n, φ(n) depends on Φ, then so do
∃xφ, ∀xφ. (6) A sentence of the form ∀x(φ(x)→ Tx), where φ(x) isT -free,
depends on the extension of φ(x) in the standard model N. (7) Dependence
is closed under arithmetical equivalence (where two sentences of LT are
6(∃xTx, 0) is an example for such a fact with respect to the scheme VL (which will be
introduced in Section 2.4). This will become apparent in Section 4, where we will also
discuss some deeper implications of the notion of faithfulness which rely crucially on our
modiﬁcation.
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arithmetically equivalent iﬀ they get the same truth value in every classical
-model).
The operator D(Φ) = {| depends on Φ} is monotonic: If Φ ⊆ Ψ, then
D(Φ) ⊆ D(Ψ). Thus, ifϕ depends onΦ, thenϕ also depends on any superset
of Φ. Let us call a set of sentences Φ D-sound iﬀ D(Φ) ⊇ Φ. This notion
must not be confused withKripke’s notion of soundness (which is soundness
with respect to the Kripke-jump). Given any D-sound set of sentences S, we
iterate the operator D as follows: D0(S) = S and Dα(S) = D(
⋃
<α D(S))
for any ordinal α > 0. By the monotonicity ofD, this process reaches a ﬁxed
point Dlf(S) =
⋃
α∈On Dα(S). We call Dlf(S) the set of sentences grounded
in S. A sentence is grounded (simpliciter) iﬀ it is grounded in the empty set,
and ungrounded otherwise.
By the monotonicity of the dependence operator, most sentences have
inﬁnitely many dependence sets. However, for certain sentences it is possible
to single out a canonical dependence set. Following Leitgeb, we say that a
sentence ϕ depends essentially on a set Φ iﬀ ϕ depends on Φ and there is no
proper subset Ψ ⊂ Φ such that ϕ also depends on Ψ. This set Φ, if it exists,
is unique, since any sentence depending on Φ and on Ψ also depends on
Φ∩Ψ.Most of the sentences usually considered in the literature on truth or
the semantic paradoxes actually have essential dependence. However, there
are many sentences that haven’t. For example, consider (a formalization of)
the following version of the Yablo sequence which we may call the nested
Yablo sequence:
Y ∗n : There is an m > n such that for all k > m, (Y
∗
k ) is false.
The reader may verify that each Y ∗n lacks essential dependence: For all
m > n, Y ∗n depends on {Y ∗m,Y ∗m+1, Y ∗m+2, . . .} but does not depend on the
intersection of these sets, the empty set; hence there is no least set on which
Y ∗n depends.
2.4. TheLeitgeb valuation schemeVL. Basedonhis notionof dependence,
Leitgeb inductively deﬁnes the following extension for the truth predicate.
Let Γ0 = ∅ and Γα = {ϕ ∈ Dα(∅) | (N,
⋃
<α Γ) |= φ}. Finally, let Γlf be
the least ﬁxed point of the Γα-hierarchy. Then the classical model (N,Γlf)
validates the T-biconditionals for all grounded sentences.7 Leitgeb’s theory
can be related to Kripke’s theory of truth in the following way.
Definition 2.6. The Leitgeb valuation scheme, VL, is given by the follow-
ing clause:
VL(S+, S−)(ϕ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1, if ϕ depends on S+ ∪ S− and (N, S+) |= φ,
0, if ϕ depends on S+ ∪ S− and (N, S+) |= φ,
1
2 , if ϕ does not depend on S
+ ∪ S−.
Obviously, VL is a monotonic valuation scheme. In fact, VL is a standard
valuation scheme in the sense of Section 2.1. Therefore, we are justiﬁed in
7Some philosophical aspects of Leitgeb’s truth theory are discussed in Meadows [15], to
which we refer the interested reader. An axiomatic truth theory based on Leitgeb’s truth
theory can be found in Schindler [17].
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using the notion of Kripke-paradoxicality with respect to VL, and similarly
for the other notions introduced by Kripke.
Proposition 2.7. The extension of the truth predicate in the minimal ﬁxed
point of JL is identical to Leitgeb’s ﬁxed point model Γlf .
A proof of this proposition can be found in Schindler [18, Proposition
5.2.17]. As a consequence, a sentence is grounded (in the sense of Leitgeb)
iﬀ it is grounded (in the sense of Kripke) with respect to VL. Thus, we have
embedded Leitgeb’s theory into Kripke’s framework.
2.5. Reference graphs for LT . We can ﬁnally turn to our deﬁnition of an
rfg.
Definition 2.8. A reference graph G of a sentence φ is a directed graph
with distinguished node φ (its root) such that
1. V (G) ⊆ LT ,
2. every vertex of G is accessible from φ, and
3. every  ∈ V (G) depends on the set of its out-neighbours.
A graph is a reference graph (simpliciter) if it is the rfg of some sentence.
Since most sentences have inﬁnitely many dependence sets, most sentences
have inﬁnitely many rfgs. Some sentences φ, however, have a canonical rfg,
i.e., an rfg of φ that is contained as a subgraph in every rfg of φ. A notion
closely related to that of a reference graph is that of a dependence tree.
Definition 2.9. A dependence tree is a tree T such that (i) every position
s of T is a sequence of LT -sentences and (ii) for every position s of T , if
φ is the last element of s , then φ depends on the set of T -children of s .
A dependence tree for φ is a dependence tree with φ as its root.
Note that any rfg is an accessible pointed graph (as deﬁned in the introduc-
tion). Therefore, any rfg of φ can be unfolded into a dependence tree for φ as
follows. The unfolding of the graphG is the tree consisting of all ﬁnite walks
in G starting from its root. The following illustration depicts the canonical
rfg of the liar (left) and the dependence tree that is its unfolding (right):
    
...
Definition 2.10. A function d : V (G) → {0, 1} is a decoration of G .
A decoration d is acceptable iﬀ for all vertices  of G :
VL(d+ , d
−
 )() = d (),
where d+ = {	 ∈ out()|d (	) = 1}, d− = {	 ∈ out()|d (	) = 0}, and
out() is the set of all out-neighbours of  in G .
Acceptable decorations give us partialmodels validating theT-biconditionals
of all sentences in V (G) as follows:
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Theorem 2.11. Let d be an acceptable decoration of a reference graph G ,
and let S+d := {φ ∈ V (G) |d (φ) = 1} and S−d := {φ ∈ V (G) |d (φ) = 0}.
Then for all φ ∈ V (G): VL(S+d , S−d )(φ) = VL(S+d , S+d )(Tφ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Decorated rfgs are closely related to what we earlier called fact-dependence
trees (compare Section 2.2). Clearly, every acceptably decorated rfg (which
is essentially a graph whose nodes are facts) can be unfolded into a fact-
dependence tree. Conversely, every fact-dependence tree T can be collapsed
into an rfg G . The vertices of G are those sentences φ such that, for some
truth value v, the fact (φ, v) is a node of T . There is an arc from φ to  iﬀ
there is an arc in T from a fact containing φ to a fact containing . Every
fact-dependence tree induces a multidecoration on the rfg it collapses to.
Definition 2.12. The multidecoration of an rfg G induced by the fact-
dependence tree T (where G is the rfg that T collapses into) is the function
DT : V (G)→ {0, 1,⊥} such that
DT (φ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1, if for every fact (φ, v) occurring in T, v = 1,
0, if for every fact (φ, v) occurring in T, v = 0,
⊥, if (φ, 1) and (φ, 0) occur in T.
Clearly, a multidecoration of G is a decoration iﬀ no node gets assigned ⊥
iﬀ the fact-dependence tree T does not contain opposite facts. For example,
the fact-dependence tree on the left induces the multidecorated rfg on the
right:
(, 0) (, 1) (, 0) (, 1)
...
(,⊥)
The following notions are adapted fromRabern et al. [16] to our framework.
Definition 2.13. A sentence is r-paradoxical (‘r’ for ‘referentially’) iﬀ it
has no rfg that admits an acceptable decoration; it is r-hypodoxical iﬀ it
has an rfg that admits a verifying acceptable decoration and a falsifying
acceptable decoration, where a decoration d of G is verifying iﬀ d assigns
1 to the root of G and falsifying iﬀ d assigns 0 to the root of G . A graph is
dangerous iﬀ it is isomorphic to an rfg of some r-paradoxical sentence.
The problem of stating necessary and suﬃcient condition for dangerous-
ness is known as the characterization problem. Its solution is one of the
most important goals of a graph-theoretic analysis of the paradoxes, and a
mathematically challenging one.
2.6. Symmetry. While this article ismostly concerned with rfgs as deﬁned
in the previous section, i.e., graphs based on the Leitgeb valuation scheme
VL, it is possible to transfer our results to other valuation schemes provided
they share certain properties withVL. Given a standard valuation schemeV ,
let us say that a sentence φ V -depends on S iﬀ there is a partition (S+, S−)
of S such that V (S+, S−)(φ) ∈ {0, 1}. Using the terminology of Yablo
[21], φ V -depends on S iﬀ there is a deﬁnite truth value v and a partition
(S+, S−) of S such that (S+, S−) jump-entails the fact (φ, v) (cf. Section
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2.2). Now, let us call a valuation scheme V symmetric iﬀ for all sentences
φ and sets of sentences S the following holds: if φ V -depends on S, then
every partition (S+, S−) of S induces a deﬁnite truth value on φ (under V ).
Notice, however, that it is not required that every partition induces the same
deﬁnite truth value on φ.
Proposition 2.14. Let V be a standard valuation scheme. Then V is sym-
metric iﬀ V satisﬁes the following equation:
V (S+, S−)(ϕ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1, if ϕ V-depends on S+ ∪ S− and (N, S+) |= φ,
0, if ϕ V-depends on S+ ∪ S− and (N, S+) |= φ,
1
2 , if ϕ does not V-depend on S
+ ∪ S−.
Proof. ⇒: Let V be symmetric and assume that V (S+, S−)(φ) = v ∈
{0, 1}. Then by deﬁnition, φ V -depends on S+∪S−, and by classical sound-
ness ofV (cf. Section2.1), vmust coincidewith the truth value thatφ receives
in the classical closure (N, S+). On the other hand, if V (S+, S−)(φ) = 12 ,
then φ cannot V -depend on S+ ∪ S−, because otherwise the symmetry of
V would imply that φ has a deﬁnite truth value in (S+, S−).
⇐: Suppose V satisﬁes the above equation and that φ V -depends
on S. Let (S+, S−) be any partition of S. Clearly, (N, S+) |= φ or
(N, S+) |= φ. In either case,V assigns a deﬁnite truth value to φ. Hence,V is
symmetric. 
Proposition 2.15. 1. φ VL-depends on S iﬀ φ depends on S.
2. VL is symmetric.
Proof. Ad (1): If φ VL-depends on S then there is a partition (S+, S−)
such that φ receives a deﬁnite truth value in the partial model (S+, S−).
The deﬁnition of VL therefore implies that φ must depend on S+ ∪ S−.
Conversely, if φ depends on S = S+∪S−, then φ will receive a deﬁnite truth
value in the partial model (S+, S−). Hence φ VL-depends on S.
Ad (2): Follows from (1) and the previous proposition. 
Lemma 2.16. Let V be a symmetric standard valuation scheme. If ϕ
V -depends on Φ, then for all partial models (S+, S−) with S+ ∪ S− ⊇ Φ:
V (S+, S−)(ϕ) = V (S+ ∩ Φ, S− ∩Φ)(ϕ).
Proof. Since S+∪S− ⊇ Φ, we have Φ = (S+∩Φ)∪ (S−∩Φ). Since V is
symmetric and ϕ V -depends on Φ we have V ((S+ ∩Φ) (S− ∩Φ))(φ) = v,
where v ∈ {0, 1}. By monotonicity, V (S+, S−)(ϕ) = v. 
Another symmetric valuation scheme, apart from VL, is the Weak Kleene
valuation scheme. This follows from the strong compositionality of theWeak
Kleene scheme. In contrast, the Strong Kleene scheme is not symmetric. For
instance, consider the sentence  ∨ T1 = 1. This sentence VSK -depends
on the set {1 = 1}, but not every partition of that set induces a deﬁnite
truth value on the sentence (under the Strong Kleene scheme). For instance,
 ∨ T1 = 1 receives the deﬁnite value 1 in the partial model ({1 = 1}, ∅)
while it receives the nondeﬁnite value 12 in the partial model (∅, {1 = 1}).
We will now give a list of the properties ofVL that we will use in the proofs
of our theorems. If V is an arbitrary valuation scheme fulﬁlling the following
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conditions then all our theorems and proofs (except those in Section 5.3) remain
valid if VL is replaced by V and dependence is replaced by V -dependence:
1. V is standard (i.e., monotonic, classically sound, at least as strong as
Weak Kleene);
2. V is symmetric;
3. V -dependence is weakly compositional in the following sense:
(a) Every arithmetical sentence V -depends on ∅,
(b) φ V -depends on Φ iﬀ ¬φ V -depends on Φ,
(c) If φ and  V -depend on Φ then φ ∧ , φ ∨  V -depend on Φ,
(d) Let φ(x) be a formula with exactly x free. If φ(n¯/x) V -depends
on Φ for all numerals n¯ then ∀xφ, ∃xφ V -depend on Φ.
An important example of a valuation scheme that satisﬁes all of the above
conditions is the Weak Kleene scheme.
In the remainder of this article (unless otherwise stated), dependence will
always mean VL-dependence, Kripke-paradoxical will always mean Kripke-
paradoxical with respect to VL (and similarly for Kripke-hypodoxical and
so on).
§3. Kripke-games on reference graphs. The main goal of this section is
to investigate connections between the structure of an rfg and the set of
decorations that are acceptable on it. In particular, we want to show that
whenever an rfg lacks certain patterns, then it admits an acceptable decora-
tion. To this endwe show that any decoration canbe obtained in a three-stage
process. First, the rfg is unfolded into a dependence tree, second, the tree is
decorated, yielding a fact-dependence tree, and third, the decorated tree is
re-collapsed onto the rfg, inducing a multidecoration on it. In Section 4 we
will show that paradoxicality enters the picture only at the third stage and
that it is quite transparent how the structure of an rfg is responsible for the
fact that the induced multidecoration is not an acceptable decoration. Due
to this we can isolate two basic patterns necessary for paradoxicality.
In the present section we will develop a tool that allows us to better
control this decoration process and to comprehend its three stages in a
single one: a multidecoration D of G can be thought of as being obtained
as the result of a game between two players (the veriﬁcation game), being
played on G . More precisely, the fact-dependence tree that induces D can
be identiﬁed with a strategy of the second player. These strategies, although
as combinatorial objects slightly more complex than fact-dependence trees,
tend to be more easily accessible for the human mind than the latter: they
allow us to formulate many of our proofs in a more intuitive way. The
veriﬁcation game is parasitic on another game (the grounding game) which
we discuss ﬁrst.8
8In Welch [20] an extensive collection of games for truth can be found, each of which
allows the characterization of the T -predicate (suggested by a particular formal theory of
truth) in terms of a player’s strategies. For our purposes, however, a mere characterization
of the T -predicate’s extension is not enough: we need a transparent reconstruction of the
valuation process leading to this extension in the rules of the game.
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3.1. The grounding game. For each sentence ϕ and set of sentences Φ we
will deﬁne a (possibly) inﬁnite game of perfect information, the grounding
game GG(ϕ,Φ) between two players (∃) and (∀), such that (∃) has a winning
strategy inGG (ϕ,Φ) iﬀϕ is grounded inΦ.9 Belowwewill see that unfoldings
of rfgs for ϕ can be identiﬁed with strategies of player (∃) in the game
GG (ϕ, ∅). The rules of GG (ϕ,Φ) are the following.
1. The players (∃), (∀) move alternately. (∀) must move ﬁrst and choose
ϕ as his ﬁrst move, ϕ1. If ϕ ∈ Φ, he cannot move.
2. As her n-th move (∃) must choose some set Φn on which ϕn depends.
3. If n > 1, as his n-thmove (∀)must choose some sentenceϕn ∈ Φn−1\Φ.
The winning conditions for GG (ϕ,Φ) are
• (∃) wins a run of the game if (∀) cannot move.
• (∀) wins a run of the game if it goes on forever.10
φ1 Φ1 φ2 Φ2
...contains depends on containsdepends on
We have a special interest in cases where the set parameter Φ denotes the
empty set; we then omit the parameter and write GG (ϕ).
3.1.1. Strategies.. Call any (possibly empty) ﬁnite sequence of legal
moves in GG (ϕ,Φ) a position of GG(ϕ,Φ). Any position is either an (∃)-
position, i.e., a position in which (∀) is to move next, or an (∀)-position,
a position in which (∃) is to move next. The set of all GG(ϕ,Φ)-positions
forms a tree which we denote by PG(ϕ,Φ).
Definition 3.1. A strategy for (∃) in GG(ϕ,Φ) is a set 
 ⊆ PG(φ,Φ) such
that (i) the empty sequence is an element of 
; (ii) for all (∃)-positions p ∈ 
:
if q ∈ PG (φ,Φ) is a successor of p, then q ∈ 
; (iii) for all (∀)-positions
p ∈ 
: if there is a q ∈ PG(φ,Φ) that is a successor of p, then 
 contains
exactly one such q; (iv) nothing else is in 
.
A strategy for (∃) is a subtree of the tree of all legal positions, and each
branch is a possible run of the game. If 
 is a strategy in GG (φ,Φ), we say
(by slight abuse of language) that φ is the root of 
. Note that a strategy
for (∃) might contain the empty sequence as its only element. We call this
strategy the trivial strategy. Note that the trivial strategy is available to
(∃) iﬀ (∀) is not able to make a ﬁrst move. This is never the case in the
parameter-free games GG(φ) because here (∀) can always make a move.
The deﬁnition of a (∀)-strategy is obtained from Deﬁnition 3.1 by replac-
ing every occurrence of ‘(∃)’ with ‘(∀)’ and vice versa.We call an (∃)-strategy

 homogenous iﬀ for each sentence  the following holds: if (∃) plays Ψ as a
response to in some 
-position, then (∃) plays Ψ as response to in every

-position.We are only interested in homogenous strategies and therefore, in
the remainder of the article, strategy will always mean homogenous strategy!
9A version of the grounding game is described in Aczel’s article on inductive deﬁnitions
[1]. We thank Jo¨nne Krienner for this hint.
10Note that (∃) can always make a move, since every sentence depends on some set, e.g.,.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bsl.2017.37
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UB der LMU München, on 05 Sep 2019 at 12:20:01, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
458 TIMO BERINGER AND THOMAS SCHINDLER
A strategy 
 is a winning strategy for (∃) in GG(ϕ,Φ) iﬀ she wins every
run of GG(ϕ,Φ) that is compatible with 
, i.e., every run of GG (ϕ,Φ) that is
a branch of the tree 
. Informally, this means that she wins every run of the
game as long as she keeps to the strategy 
, regardless of the moves of her
opponent (∀). Analogously, a winning strategy for (∀) is deﬁned.
Let φ be the sentence T1 = 1∨TT1 = 1. The following is a winning
strategy for (∃) in the game GG(φ).
T1 = 1 ∨ TT1 = 1
{1 = 1, T1 = 1}
1 = 1 T1 = 1
{1 = 1}
1 = 1
∅
∅
The grounding game derives its name from the fact that a sentence ϕ is
grounded in S (that is, φ ∈ Dlf(S)) iﬀ (∃) has a winning strategy in the
game GG(ϕ, S).
Theorem 3.2. Let S be a D-sound set. ϕ is grounded in S iﬀ (∃) has a
winning strategy in the game GG(ϕ, S).
Proof. ⇒: By inductionon the rankD of the sentencesϕ that are grounded
in S, where rankD(φ) is deﬁned as the least ordinal α such that ϕ ∈ Dα(S).
Let rankD(ϕ)= 0. Thus φ ∈ D0(S) = S. Then the trivial strategy is a
winning strategy for (∃). Now let rankD(ϕ) = α for some ordinal α > 0.
Then ϕ depends on some Φ ⊆ Dlf(S) whose members have strictly lower
rankD than ϕ. If Φ ⊆ S then again (∃) can choose S as her ﬁrst move in
GG (ϕ, S) and this is a winning strategy for her. Otherwise Φ = ∅, and by
induction hypothesis (∃) has a winning strategy in GG(,S) for all  ∈ Φ.
Thus she plays Φ as her ﬁrst move and whichever  ∈ Φ player (∀) chooses
next, (∃) simply plays her winning strategy in GG(,S). This is a winning
strategy for her in GG(ϕ, S). (Observe that this is indeed a strategy, since (∃)
can always choose the same Φ on various recurrences of φ.)
⇐: By induction on the strategy-rank of a sentence,
rankG(ϕ) = min{rank(
) |
 is a winning-strategy for (∃) in GG(ϕ, S)},
Here, rank(
) = sup{rank()+1) |  is the (∃)-substrategy of 
 in GG (,S),
 is a possible response for (∀) to (∃)’s ﬁrst move in 
}. Notice that any
winning strategy for (∃) must be well-founded (as a tree), thus rank(
)
is well-deﬁned. Suppose that (∃) has a winning strategy 
 in GG (ϕ, S).
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If rankG (ϕ) = 0 then φ must depend on some subset of S and is therefore
grounded in S. Now let rankG (ϕ) = α for some ordinal α > 0.Without loss
of generality we may assume that rank(
) = α. Then rankG () < α for all
 ∈ Ψ, where Ψ is the ﬁrst move of (∃) in 
. Thus by induction hypothesis
all  ∈ Ψ are grounded in S. Since ϕ depends on Ψ ⊆ Dlf(S), it follows
that ϕ is grounded in S.
[Observe that we could have easily proved that rankD(ϕ)=rankG (ϕ) for
all sentences ϕ that are grounded in S.] 
3.1.2. Strategies, dependence trees, and rfgs.. Our three notions of an rfg,
a dependence tree, and an (∃)-strategy are closely related. Say that a depen-
dence tree T is homogenous iﬀ for all positions s, t of T , if the last elements
of s, t are identical, then the set of T -children of s, t are the same. Any
homogenous dependence tree T for φ induces, or can be interpreted as,
an (∃)-strategy in GG(φ): (∃) chooses as her reply to a given (∀)-move 
simply the set of all the T -children of . Second, given any (∃)-strategy 
 in
GG(φ), a homogenousdependence treeT
 forφ canbe constructedby simply
deleting all moves of (∃) (namely, the dependence sets Φn) from 
. Hence
there is a canonical bijection between homogenous dependence trees and
(∃)-strategies. For example, the following dependence tree is obtained from
the strategy depicted earlier.
T1 = 1 ∨ TT1 = 1
1 = 1 T1 = 1
1 = 1
Third, any dependence tree can be collapsed into an rfg and any rfg can be
unfolded into a homogenous dependence tree. Finally, every (∃)-strategy 

can be collapsed to an rfg Γ(
) whose unfolding is the dependence tree T
 .
The set of vertices of Γ(
) consists of the sentences occurring in 
; two
vertices , 	 are joined by an arc from  to 	 iﬀ there is a run of the
game (played according to 
) in which (∀) chooses , 	 consecutively. As a
consequence, we can interpret the grounding game for a sentence φ as being
played on an rfg of φ, namely the rfg that (∃)’s chosen strategy collapses to.
Notice that a winning strategy for (∃) is a well-founded tree. We therefore
obtain that a strategy 
 for (∃) in GG (ϕ) is a winning strategy for (∃) iﬀ the
rfg Γ(
) is well-founded. Combining this with Theorem 3.2, we obtain
Corollary 3.3. A sentenceϕ is grounded iﬀϕ has a well-founded reference
graph.
3.2. The verification game. The veriﬁcation game GT (ϕ, v,F) is quite
similar to the grounding game GG(ϕ,Φ), but this time the players are not
dealing merely with sentences ϕ and sets of sentences Φ, but with facts
(φ, v) and consistent sets of facts F . (Recall our conventions in Section 2.2
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regarding facts and partial models.) A second diﬀerence to the grounding
game is that a run of the veriﬁcation game can end in a draw. Let us say that
a partial model (Φ+,Φ−) is compatiblewith a set of facts F iﬀ Φ+∩F− = ∅
and Φ− ∩ F+ = ∅.
To every position of the game GT (ϕ, v,F) a mode is associated, the mode
that a run of the game assumes in this position. This mode is either the
veriﬁcationmode (=1)or the falsiﬁcationmode (=0). The rules ofGT (ϕ, v,F)
are
1. The game GT (ϕ, 1,F) starts in the veriﬁcationmode, GT (ϕ, 0,F) starts
in the falsiﬁcation mode.
2. (∀) must move ﬁrst and choose ϕ as his ﬁrst move, ϕ1. If ϕ ∈ F+ ∪F−
he cannot move.
3. As her n-th move, (∃) must choose some partial model (Φ+n , Φ−n )
compatible withF such thatϕn depends onΦ+n ∪Φ−n and (N,Φ+n ) |= ϕn
if the game is in veriﬁcation mode, and (N,Φ+n ) |= ϕn if the game is in
falsiﬁcation mode.
4. If n > 1, as his n-th move (∀) must choose some sentence ϕn ∈
(Φ+n−1 \ F+) ∪ (Φ−n−1 \ F−). If ϕn ∈ Φ+n−1 then play continues in the
veriﬁcation mode. If ϕn ∈ Φ−n−1 then play continues in the falsiﬁcation
mode.
The winning conditions for GT (ϕ, v,F) are
• If a run of the game goes on forever it is declared a draw.
• If a player cannot move according to the rules 3 or 4 then the other
player wins this run of the game.
• If (∀) cannot move according to rule 2 then he loses the game iﬀϕ ∈ F+
and v = 1 or if ϕ ∈ F− and v = 0. In the other cases he wins.
In order to relate our two notions of Kripke- and r-paradoxicality (cf.
Theorem 3.9 and Proposition 3.10), special attention is paid to cases where
the set parameter F denotes the empty set; we then write GT (ϕ, v). Since we
want to keep track of the mode of game, we represent the possible positions
as follows: ((φ1, v1), (Φ+1 ,Φ
−
1 ), . . . , (φn, vn), (Φ
+
n ,Φ
−
n )), where vi is either 1
or 0 according as to whether the game is in veriﬁcation or falsiﬁcation mode
after (∀)’s i-th move. (Thus a position is an alternating sequence of facts
and partial models.) We denote the set of legal positions of GT (φ, v,F) by
PT (φ, v,F). The deﬁnition of an (∃)-strategy in GT (φ, v,F) is obtained from
Deﬁnition 3.1 by replacing every occurrence of ‘GG(φ,Φ)’ by ‘GT (φ, v,F)’
and every occurrence of ‘PG(φ,Φ)’ by ‘PT (φ, v,F)’. Just as before, the
deﬁnition of a (∀)-strategy is obtained by switching the roles of (∃) and (∀).
An (∃)-strategy in the veriﬁcation game is homogenous iﬀ for all sentences
 the following holds: if (∃) plays a partition (Ψ+,Ψ−) of Ψ in response
to  in some 
-position, then (∃) plays some partition of Ψ in response to
 in every 
-position. Again, our interest is only with homogenous strategies
and for the remainder of the article, strategy will always mean homogenous
strategy!
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For illustrative purposes, let us return to our earlier example. Let φ be
again the sentence T1 = 1∨TT1 = 1. Then the following is a winning
strategy for (∃) in the game GT (φ, 1).
(T1 = 1 ∨ TT1 = 1, 1)
({1 = 1, T1 = 1}, ∅)
(1 = 1, 1) (T1 = 1, 1)
({1 = 1}, ∅)
(1 = 1, 1)
(∅, ∅)
(∅, ∅)
One reason we are interested in the veriﬁcation game is that it allows us
to investigate the relation between rfgs and acceptable decorations of rfgs.
First, observe that (sets of) facts can be seen as decorations of (sets of)
sentences with truth values.
Definition 3.4. Let ‖(φ, v)‖ := φ and ‖F‖ := ‖(F+,F−)‖ := F+∪F−.
We call (φ, v) a decoration of φ. We call F a decoration of Φ iﬀ ‖F‖ = Φ. If

 is an (∃)-strategy in the veriﬁcation game, let ‖
‖ := {‖p‖ |p ∈ 
}, where
‖p‖ is the sequence that results from p by applying the operator ‖ · ‖ to each
component of p. We say that 
 is a decoration of ‖
‖.
Clearly, if 
 is a nonlosing (∃)-strategy in the veriﬁcation game (i.e., a
strategy such that (∃) never loses as long as she plays according to it), then
‖
‖ is an (∃)-strategy in the grounding game. Thus, a nonlosing strategy
in the veriﬁcation game can be seen as the result of decorating a strategy
in the grounding game with truth values. Of course, there are many ways
of decorating a grounding strategy. This changes under the stipulation that
winning strategies must be mapped to winning strategies:
Theorem 3.5. Let F be a consistent set of facts. Then player (∃) has a
nontrivial winning strategy 
 in GG (ϕ, ‖F‖) iﬀ (∃) has a nontrivial winning
strategy 
′ in either GT (ϕ, 1,F) or in GT (ϕ, 0,F). Moreover, 
′ is the unique
decoration of 
 that is a winning strategy for (∃) in either GT (ϕ, 1,F) or
GT (ϕ, 0,F).
Proof. ⇒: Let 
 be a nontrivial winning strategy for (∃) in GG (ϕ,Φ),
where Φ = ‖F‖. As with Theorem 3.2, the proof is by induction on the
strategy-rank of a sentence, rankG (φ). Let Ψ be (∃)’s 
-response to ϕ.
Then ϕ depends on Ψ and by induction hypothesis (∃) has either a winning
strategy 
′ in GT (, 1,F) or in GT (, 0,F), for all  ∈ Ψ. Let Ψ+ be the
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set of all members of Ψ such that the ﬁrst is the case and Ψ− be the set of
all members of Ψ such that the second alternative holds. If ValΨ+(ϕ)=1,
then playing (Ψ+,Ψ−) as her ﬁrst move in GT (ϕ, 1,F) followed by 
′ as
a response to (∀)’s move  is a winning strategy for (∃) in GT (ϕ, 1,F).
If ValΨ+(ϕ)=0, then playing (Ψ+,Ψ−) as her ﬁrst move in GT (ϕ, 0,F)
followed by 
′ as a response to (∀)’s move  is a winning strategy for (∃)
in GT (ϕ, 0,F). By induction one proves that the strategy 
′ thus deﬁned is
a decoration of the strategy 
 and in fact the only decoration of 
 that is a
winning strategy for (∃) in either GT (, 1,F) or in GT (, 0,F).
⇐: Suppose w.l.o.g. that (∃) has a winning strategy 
 in GT (φ, 1,F). Then

 is a well-founded tree (for otherwise (∀) could draw the game). Hence ‖
‖
is well-founded tree and thus a winning strategy for (∃) in GG (φ, ‖F‖). 
Corollary 3.6. Every well-founded rfg admits a unique acceptable
decoration.
The veriﬁcation game derives its name from the property that a sentence ϕ
is true in the ﬁxed point of JL generated by F iﬀ (∃) has a winning strategy
in GT (ϕ, 1,F) and that ϕ is false in this ﬁxed point iﬀ (∃) has a winning
strategy in GT (ϕ, 0,F).
Theorem 3.7. Let F be a consistent and sound set of facts. Then ϕ has the
deﬁnite truth value v in the Kripke ﬁxed point generated by (F+,F−) iﬀ (∃)
has a winning strategy in GT (ϕ, v,F).
Proof. ⇒: Suppose ϕ has the deﬁnite truth value v in the ﬁxed point of
JL generated by F . (Since F is consistent and sound, such a ﬁxed point
exists.) Hence ϕ is grounded in F+ ∪ F− and by Theorem 3.2, (∃) has a
winning strategy 
 in GG(ϕ,F+ ∪ F−). Then the strategy 
′ as deﬁned in
the proof of Theorem 3.5 is a winning strategy for (∃) in GT (ϕ, v,F).
⇐: Suppose (∃) has a winning strategy 
′ in GT (ϕ, v,F). Then by
Theorem 3.5 (∃) has a winning strategy 
 in GG(ϕ, F+ ∪ F−). By
Theorem 3.2, ϕ is grounded in F+ ∪ F−. Since F is consistent and sound,
φ must have a deﬁnite truth value in the ﬁxed point generated by F .
Therefore, if φ had value 1 − v in this ﬁxed point, (∃) would have a win-
ning strategy in GT (ϕ, 1 − v,F) by the ﬁrst part of this theorem. But by
Theorem 3.5, this contradicts the assumption that (∃) has a winning strategy
in GT (ϕ, v,F). 
3.3. Paradoxicality and verification strategies. Now let us investigate how
acceptable decorations of rfgs are related to strategies in the veriﬁcation
game. In order to do so, we cannot focus solely on winning strategies but
need a somewhat more liberal criterion for a good (∃)-strategy 
 in the
veriﬁcation-game:
Definition 3.8. A veriﬁcation-strategy 
 for (∃) is faithful iﬀ (∃) never
loses a game whenever she plays 
. We call 
 consistent iﬀ no sentence
occurring in 
 (played by (∀)) occurs in both the veriﬁcation- and the
falsiﬁcation-mode (i.e., if 
 contains no opposite facts). A multidecoration
is faithful (consistent) iﬀ it is induced by faithful (consistent) veriﬁcation-
strategy.
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Just as an (∃)-strategy in the grounding game corresponds to a depen-
dence tree, a faithful (∃)-strategy 
 in the veriﬁcation game corresponds
to a faithful fact-dependence tree. That is, given a faithful (∃)-strategy in
the veriﬁcation game, one obtains a homogenous11 faithful fact-dependence
tree by deleting all (∃)-moves from 
 (i.e., the partial models (Φ+n ,Φ−n )).
Conversely, every homogenous faithful fact-dependence tree T induces a
faithful veriﬁcation strategy: (∃) chooses as her reply to a given (∀)-move
(, v) simply the set of itsT -children. Since, as we have noted in Section 2.5,
every fact-dependence tree can be collapsed into an rfg, we can view the ver-
iﬁcation game as being played on an rfg as well. The following theorem can
be seen as a reformulation of Theorem 2.3 of Yablo [21] within our frame-
work. (Recall our discussion of this theorem and the notion of faithfulness
in Section 2.2.)
Theorem 3.9. A sentence φ has the truth value v in some Kripke ﬁxed point
(Φ+,Φ−) iﬀ (∃) has a faithful consistent strategy 
 in GT (φ, v). Moreover
(Φ+,Φ−) ⊇ (F+
 ,F−
 ), where F
 is the set of all facts occurring in 
.
Proof. ⇒: Suppose ϕ has the truth value v in some ﬁxed point (Φ+,Φ−).
Then for each  ∈ Φ+ ∪Φ− there is some consistent (Ψ+,Ψ−) ⊆ (Φ+,Φ−)
such that  depends on Ψ+ ∪ Ψ− and  has a deﬁnite truth value in
(Ψ+,Ψ−). (This is so because  can only be in the ﬁxed point if it is made
true/false in some partial model that is a submodel of the ﬁxed point,
and  must depend on the union of the extension and anti-extension of
that model, by deﬁnition of VL.) Thus, using the axiom of choice, we can
build up a strategy 
 for player (∃) in GT (ϕ, v) layer by layer. 
 is faithful
by construction and consistent because (Φ+,Φ−), being a ﬁxed point, is
consistent by deﬁnition.
⇐: Let 
 be a consistent, faithful strategy for player (∃) inGT (ϕ, v). LetF

be the set of all facts occurring in 
. Since 
 is consistent, the pair (F+
 ,F−
 )
is a partial model. Because 
 is a faithful strategy, for each (, v′) ∈ F

there is a set of facts E ⊆ F
 such that VL(E+, E−)() = v′. Hence by
monotonicity of VL, (F+
 ,F−
 ) is sound. Hence there is some ﬁxed point
(Φ+,Φ−) extending it and ϕ has the truth value v in (Φ+,Φ−). 
Hence, a sentence ϕ is Kripke-paradoxical iﬀ every strategy for (∃) in
GT (ϕ, 1) or in GT (ϕ, 0) is either unfaithful or inconsistent. On the other
hand, ϕ is Kripke-hypodoxical iﬀ there are faithful and consistent strategies
for (∃) in GT (ϕ, 1) and in GT (ϕ, 0).
Proposition 3.10. Let G be an rfg of φ and d be a multidecoration of G .
Then d is an verifying acceptable decoration ofG iﬀ it is induced by a faithful
consistent (∃)-strategy inGT (φ, 1), andd is an falsifying acceptable decoration
of G iﬀ it is induced by a faithful consistent (∃)-strategy in GT (φ, 0).
Corollary 3.11. A sentence is Kripke-paradoxical iﬀ it is r-paradoxical.
11A fact-dependence tree T is homogenous iﬀ for all s, t ∈ T : if the ﬁrst components (the
sentences) of the last elements of s, t are the same then the T -children of s, t are partitions
of the same set of sentences.
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Given Proposition 3.10, we say that an (∃)-strategy in the veriﬁcation game
is acceptable iﬀ it is both faithful and consistent. Kripke [13] writes: ‘The
largest intrinsic ﬁxed point is the unique ‘largest’ interpretation of T (x)
which is consistent with our intuitive idea of truth and makes no arbi-
trary choices in truth assignments.’ The following theorem formulates this
‘nonarbitrariness’ in terms of decorations:
Corollary 3.12. A sentence is in the largest intrinsic ﬁxed point of JVL
iﬀ it has an rfg that admits either a verifying acceptable decoration or a
falsifying acceptable decoration (but not both). As a consequence, a sentence
is Kripke-hypodoxical iﬀ it is r-hypodoxical.
Proof. ⇒: Let v ∈ {0, 1} be the truth value assigned to ϕ by the largest
intrinsic ﬁxed point. By Theorem 3.9 there is a faithful and consistent
(∃)-strategy in GT (ϕ, v). Suppose there is also some faithful and consistent
(∃)-strategy in GT (ϕ, 1 − v). By the right-to-left direction of Theorem 3.9
this implies that ϕ has the deﬁnite truth value v in one ﬁxed point and 1− v
in some other ﬁxed point. But this contradicts the assumption that ϕ is
intrinsic.
⇐: Supposeϕ has nodeﬁnite truth value in the largest intrinsic ﬁxed point.
By Proposition 2.1, this means that ϕ is either paradoxical or hypodoxical.
By Theorem 3.9, in the ﬁrst case there is no faithful and consistent strategy
in either GT (ϕ, 0) or in GT (ϕ, 1). In the second case, there is a faithful and
consistent strategy both in GT (ϕ, 0) and in GT (ϕ, 1). 
§4. Core and periphery of reference graphs. We have seen that φ is Kripke-
paradoxical iﬀ any (∃)-strategy in the veriﬁcation game is either unfaithful
or inconsistent (i.e., unacceptable). In this section we will show that (∃) can
actually always choose a faithful strategy. This can be understood as some
kind of normalization result for veriﬁcation strategies and it is a crucial step
towards our goal of a graph-theoretical understanding of paradoxicality
because inconsistency, unlike unfaithfulness, can be related to structural
properties (cf. Section 4.5) of an rfg. Unfaithfulness, on the other hand,
cannot be related to structural properties—those that are preserved under
graph isomorphism. The above mentioned result (Corollary 4.12) follows
from Lemma 4.11, to which we will refer as the Fundamental Lemma—it is
indeed the foundation for almost all the results in the rest of this article. The
Fundamental Lemma also sheds light on the key concept of this section:
the separation of an rfg into periphery and core. Roughly speaking, the
periphery of an rfg consists of those parts whose unfolding can be decorated
in a unique way by truth values such that the resulting veriﬁcation strategy
is faithful while in the core there are various such decorations. Intuitively,
the periphery is the ‘sphere of inﬂuence’ of the ‘atoms’ (or sinks) of an rfg
G (the nodes with no out-neighbours). If we imagine that the veriﬁcation
game is being played on G then the periphery of G is the part where (∃) has
one and only one move that is nonlosing while she always has at least two
nonlosing moves on the core. That she has indeed always at least one move
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that is nonlosing is an important consequence of the Fundamental Lemma.
We will show that the phenomena of paradoxicality and hypodoxicality
can be tied down to the structure of the core of an rfg. Moreover, we
will give a characterization of the periphery in terms of Cantini’s valuation
scheme, VFV .
4.1. The concept of core and periphery.
Definition 4.1. Let G be an rfg and  be a vertex of G . We denote by
G the subgraph of G induced by the vertices of G accessible from .
1. Call  bivalent in G iﬀ G has
(a) a faithful multidecoration d with d () = ⊥ or
(b) a faithful multidecoration d0 with d0() = 0 and a faithful
multidecoration with d1() = 1.
2. Call  univalent in G iﬀ G has no faithful multidecoration d with
d () = ⊥, and it either has a faithful multidecoration d0 with d0() =
0 or a faithful multidecoration d1 with d1() = 1, but not both. In
the ﬁrst case we call  0-univalent in G, in the second case we call 
1-univalent in G.
3. The core of an rfg is the set of its bivalent vertices.
4. The periphery of an rfg is the set of its univalent vertices.
It is obvious that any grounded sentence lies in the periphery, while the liar
 lies in the core of every rfg in which it occurs. On the other hand,  ∨ ¬
always lies in the periphery, as one cannot make the sentence false. This is
still the case if we consider the Weak Kleene scheme.  ∨ ¬ is paradoxical
relative to VWK (because it essentially VWK -depends on {}) but, since one
cannot make it false, lies in the periphery of any rfg in which it occurs.
Similarly, ∃xTx is a sentence that is paradoxical relative to VL but lies in the
periphery of any rfg in which it occurs. There is one multidecoration that
makes this sentence false, but it is unfaithful. (That ∃xTx is paradoxical
relative to VL relies on the fact that it depends essentially on the set of all
sentences.)
The sentences in the core of an rfg could be described as ‘ambiguous’
while the sentences in the periphery are ‘unambiguous’. So we can expect to
tie down the phenomena of paradoxicality and hypodoxicality to the core
of an rfg, ignoring its periphery. Now, we have already noted that some
paradoxical sentences like ∃xTx are in the periphery rather than in the core.
However, we will see later (cf. Theorem 4.30) that the reference patterns that
make some sentence paradoxical lie within the core of its rfgs (e.g., in the rfg
of ∃xTx, that sentence has an arc pointing to itself, but this loop is not what
makes it paradoxical: the problem is that the rfg contains the self-referential
liar in its core). Notice that it not clear from the above deﬁnition that any
vertex of an rfg belongs either to its core or to its periphery. However, in
Section 4.3 we will show that every rfg can indeed be decomposed into core
and periphery. A simple but useful observation about the periphery is the
following:
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Proposition 4.2. Let G be an rfg.
1. No vertex of G belongs to both the core and the periphery of G .
2. If G admits a faithful multidecoration, then every vertex of G belongs
either to its core or to its periphery.
3. Any faithful multidecoration of G is consistent on its periphery.
4. Any two faithful multidecorations of G coincide on its periphery.
Proposition 4.3. The well-founded part of an rfg is contained in its
periphery.
Proof. By Theorem 3.5. 
The converse of this proposition fails. Here is an example of a nonwell-
founded rfg all of whose vertices lie in its periphery: For each n ∈  let
φn ↔ ¬Tφn+1∧¬T1 = 1. Consider the canonical rfg of φ0. Cleary there
is one and only one faithful multidecoration of this graph, assigning 1 to
1 = 1 and 0 to each φn. Later on, we will give an exact characterization of
the sentences that are in the periphery of an rfg (Corollary 4.17). In order
to formulate this result (and some other of our main results), we need to
introduce an operator that maps every standard valuation scheme to an
expansion of that scheme.
4.2. The saturated closure of VL. Let V be a standard valuation scheme.
We deﬁne
Vˆ (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1, if (Ψ
+,Ψ−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−) s.t. Ψ+ ∩Ψ− = ∅ ∧
V (Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) = 0,
0, if (Ψ
+,Ψ−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−) s.t. Ψ+ ∩Ψ− = ∅ ∧
V (Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) = 1,
1
2 , otherwise.
We call Vˆ the saturated closure of V . Observe that Vˆ is well-deﬁned since
any (Φ+,Φ−) has an extension (Ψ+,Ψ−) such that V (Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) ∈ {0, 1}
(namely, the classical close-oﬀ).
Lemma 4.4. Let V be any standard valuation scheme. Then:
1. Vˆ is monotonic.
2. V ≤ Vˆ , i.e., Vˆ is at least as strong as V .
3. Vˆ is classically sound.
Proof. Ad (1): Let (Φ+,Φ−) ⊆ (Ψ+,Ψ−) and let Vˆ (Φ+,Φ−)(ϕ) =
v ∈ {0, 1}. This means that V (S+, S−)(ϕ) ∈ {v, 12} for all (S+, S−) ⊇
(Φ+,Φ−). Hence V (S+, S−)(ϕ) ∈ {v, 12} for all (S+, S−) ⊇ (Ψ+,Ψ−).
Thus Vˆ (Ψ+,Ψ−)(ϕ) = v.
Ad (2): Let v ∈ {0, 1} and V (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = v. Since V is monotonic
there is no (Ψ+,Ψ−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−) with V (Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) = 1 − v. Hence
Vˆ (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = v.
Ad (3): Assume w.l.o.g. that Vˆ (S+, S−)(ϕ) = 1 and that ValS+(ϕ) = 0.
Then V (S+, S− ∪ ( \ S+))(ϕ) = 0 since VWK ≤ V and VWK (S+, S− ∪
( \ S+))(ϕ) = 0 (since VWK is classically sound). But (S+, S−) ⊆
(S+, S− ∪ ( \ S+)). This is a contradiction to Vˆ (S+, S−)(ϕ) = 1. 
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Corollary 4.5. If V is a standard valuation scheme then so is Vˆ .
Proof. Lemma 4.4(2) implies that VWK ≤ Vˆ . By 4.4(1), Vˆ is monotonic
and by 4.4(3), Vˆ is classically sound. 
Now consider the supervaluation scheme VFV given by Cantini in [4]:
VFV (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if ∀(Ψ
+,Ψ−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−)(Ψ+ ∩Ψ− = ∅ ⇒
(N,Ψ+) |= φ),
0, if ∀(Ψ
+,Ψ−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−)(Ψ+ ∩Ψ− = ∅ ⇒
(N,Ψ+) |= φ),
1
2 , otherwise.
We will call VFV the Cantini valuation scheme. Obviously, it is a standard
valuation scheme. We will now show that the Cantini valuation scheme is
maximal among the standard schemes.
Theorem 4.6. Let V be any standard valuation scheme. Then Vˆ = VFV .
In particular, VˆL = VFV .
Proof. Suppose w.l.o.g. that VFV (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = 1. Thus (N,Ψ+) |= φ
for all consistent (Ψ+,Ψ−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−). We want to show that
Vˆ (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = 1. Assume Vˆ (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = 1. Then there is some
consistent (Ψ+,Ψ−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−) with V (Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) = 0. By classical
soundness, (N,Ψ+) |= φ. But this contradicts our above assumption.
Now suppose w.l.o.g. that Vˆ (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = 1. Hence for all consistent
(S+, S−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−): V (S+, S−)(φ) = 0. In particular, this holds for all
consistent “classical” models, where (S+, S−) is classical if S+ ∪ S− = .
Let (Ψ+,Ψ−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−) be an arbitrary consistent model and consider
(Ψ+,Ψ−∪ ( \Ψ+)), which is consistent and classical. Since V is at least as
strong asVWK this means thatV (Ψ+,Ψ−∪(\Ψ+))(φ) = 1 (becauseVWK
assigns a deﬁnite truth value in all classical models). Since V is classically
sound we get (N,Ψ+) |= φ. Hence VFV (Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = 1. 
Corollary 4.7. VFV is the maximal standard valuation scheme. Hence any
monotonic valuation scheme V > VFV is classically unsound.
The following game can be looked at as a more abstract version of the ver-
iﬁcation game in the absence of a well-behaved (i.e., symmetric) dependence
relation. (Note that VˆL is not symmetric.) In particular, there is no ground-
ing game for VˆL. A second diﬀerence is that we keep track of the mode only
indirectly: it is encoded in the truth-value component of (∀)’s moves.
For each fact (ϕ, v) and each set of facts F , deﬁne the VˆL-veriﬁcation
game, GˆT (ϕ, v,F), between two players (∃) and (∀) as follows:
1. (∀) must move ﬁrst and choose (ϕ, v) as his ﬁrst move (ϕ1, v1). If
φ ∈ F+ ∪ F− he cannot move.
2. As her n-th move (∃) must choose some partial model (Φ+n ,Φ−n )
compatible with F such that VˆL(Φ+n ,Φ−n )(ϕn) = vn.
3. If n > 1, as his n-th move (∀) must choose some fact (ϕn, vn) such that
ϕn ∈ Φ+n−1 if vn = 1 and ϕn ∈ Φ−n−1 if vn = 0.
The winning conditions for GˆT (ϕ, v,F) are
• If a run of the game goes on forever it is declared a draw.
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• If a player cannot move according to the rules 2 or 3 then the other
player wins this run of the game.
• If (∀) cannot move according to rule 1 then he loses the game iﬀϕ ∈ F+
and v = 1 or if ϕ ∈ F− and v = 0. In the other cases he wins.
To prepare the Fundamental Lemma we need the following lemmata.
Proposition 4.8. Let F be a consistent and sound set of facts. Then (∃)
has a winning strategy either in GˆT (ϕ, 1,F) or in GˆT (ϕ, 0,F) (but not in both)
iﬀ ϕ is in the least ﬁxed point of JVˆL generated by F .
Proof. ⇒: By induction on the strategy-rank of ϕ.
⇐: By induction on the inductive rank of ϕ. 
Corollary 4.9. If there is some well-founded faithful fact-dependence tree
for VˆL with root (φ, v) then there is no well-founded fact-dependence tree for
VˆL with root (φ, 1− v).
Lemma 4.10. Let F be a consistent and sound set of facts and φ a sentence.
Then there is either no winning strategy for (∃) in GˆT (φ, v,F) or no faithful
strategy for (∃) in GT (φ, 1− v,F).
Proof. Assume φ is a sentence such that there is a winning (∃)-strategy 
in GˆT (φ, v,F) and a faithful (∃)-strategy 
 in GT (φ, 1− v,F). By induction
on the strategy-rank α of  we show that this leads to a contradiction. The
claim is trivial if  is the trivial strategy. So assume that  is nontrivial.
Let (Φ+,Φ−) be (∃)’s -response to φ. Then VˆL(Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = v. Let
(Ψ+,Ψ−) be (∃)’s
-response toφ. ThenVL(Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) = 1−v.Moreover,
by rule 3 of the veriﬁcation game for VL, (Ψ+,Ψ−) is compatible with F .
Let α = 0. This means that (∀) cannot move anymore and accordingly
(Φ+,Φ−) = (F+,F−). Hence VˆL(F+,F−)(φ) = v. Since F is compatible
with (Ψ+,Ψ−), this is a contradiction. (First,VL(Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) = 1−v. Since
F is compatible with (Ψ+,Ψ−), (Ψ+∪F+,Ψ−∪F−) is a partial model that
extends (F+,F−). But bymonotonicity ofVL,VL(Ψ+∪F+,Ψ−∪F−)(φ) =
1− v. This contradicts VˆL(F+,F−)(φ) = v, by deﬁnition of VˆL.)
Now let α > 0 and suppose the claim holds for all  < α. Then
(∗) Φ+ ∩Ψ− = ∅ and Φ− ∩Ψ+ = ∅.
To prove (∗), assume w.l.o.g. that there is a  ∈ Ψ− ∩ Φ+. Let ′ be the
substrategy of  determined by the root . Then ′ is a winning strategy
for (∃) in GˆT (, 1,F) (because  ∈ Φ+). Since the rank of ′ is less than
α, by I.H. there is no faithful strategy for (∃) in GT (, 0,F). But this is
contradicting the fact that 
 is a faithful strategy in GT (, 0,F). (The latter
is the case because 
 is a faithful strategy in GT (φ, 1− v,F) and  ∈ Ψ−.)
Let 	+ = Ψ+ ∪ Φ+ and 	− = Ψ− ∪ Φ−. By (∗), (	+, 	−) is a partial
model. Since 	+ ∩ 	− = ∅, and (	+, 	−) ⊇ (Ψ+,Ψ−), we obtain that
VL(	+, 	−)(φ) = 1 − v. Since also (	+, 	−) ⊇ (Φ+,Φ−), this contradicts
VˆL(Φ+,Φ−)(φ) = v, by deﬁnition of VˆL. 
4.3. The Fundamental Lemma. For the following Fundamental Lemma,
it will be convenient to compare GˆT -strategies to GG -strategies. For any
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GˆT -strategy 
, let ‖
‖ be the result of applying the operator ‖ · ‖ to every
component of every position of 
 (cf. Section 3.2). Thus ‖
‖ is a tree just of
same type as a strategy in the grounding-game, and we shall write, given an
(∃)-strategy  in the latter, ‖
‖   iﬀ ‖
‖ is a subtree of  with the same root
as . Recall that where 
 is a strategy, Γ(
) is the rfg that 
 collapses into.
Finally, recall that a set of facts is faithful iﬀ each of its members is a faithful
fact, where a fact (ϕ, v) is faithful iﬀ there is a faithful fact-dependence
tree with root (ϕ, v), iﬀ (∃) has a faithful strategy in GT (ϕ, v). We can now
formulate the Fundamental Lemma:
Lemma 4.11. Let φ be a sentence and Φ any D-sound set of sentences. Let

 be an (∃)-strategy in GG(φ,Φ) and let F be a faithful, consistent and sound
set of facts with ‖F‖ = Φ.
1. There is a truth value v and a nonlosing (∃)-strategy 
∗ in GT (φ, v,F)
with ‖
∗‖ = 
.
2. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) there are faithful decorations 
∗ and 
¯∗ of 
 such that 
∗ is a strategy
in GT (ϕ, 0,F) and 
¯∗ is a strategy in GT (ϕ, 1,F),
(b) there is neither a winning strategy  for (∃) in GˆT (ϕ, 0,F) nor in
GˆT (ϕ, 1,F) such that ‖‖  
.
We will give a proof of this Fundamental Lemma in Section 4.4. First let us
note some of its important consequences:
Corollary 4.12. Every rfg G admits a faithful multidecoration.
This is the corollarywe referred to as a ‘normalization result’ in the introduc-
tion of Section 4. In terms of Yablo’s article that we quoted in Section 2.2:
We—if we identify with (∃)—can indeed always choose to maintain that
Epimenides was really a Cretan and thus elect (structural) inconsistency
over (nonstructural) unfaithfulness. But convincing as this may sound, the
result is far from trivial—we will see this when we prove the Fundamental
Lemma. The technical problem consists, roughly speaking, in rfgs generally
being nonwell-founded, so that we cannot use inductive methods (running
bottom-up) to deﬁne a faithful decoration on them. We have to ﬁnd such
a decoration running top-down (a rather co-inductive technique) and must
take care that we never hit the ground where it is unfaithful. Further, the
nontriviality of Lemma 4.11 is underlined by the fact that it doesn’t hold
for nonsymmetric valuation schemes, e.g., the Strong Kleene valuation. We
refer the reader to Section 4.6 for further discussion.
Corollary 4.13. Every rfg has a decomposition of its vertices into
periphery and core.
Proof. By 4.2 and 4.12. 
The following corollaries describe how paradoxicality and hypodoxicality
can be related to the core:
Corollary 4.14. Every faithful multidecoration of an rfg G that is
consistent on the core of G is consistent, i.e., is a decoration of G .
Proof. By 4.2(3). 
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Corollary 4.15. Ifφ is r-paradoxical or r-hypodoxical then every reference
graph of φ has a nonempty core.
Proof. By 4.2(3), 4.2(4), and 3.12. 
The following notions are introduced to formulate further consequences of
the Fundamental Lemma. They will also play a role in Section 5. Call a
sentence φ absolutely bivalent or a core-sentence iﬀ for every rfg G it is the
case that φ occurs in the core ofG whenever it occurs inG . Call φ absolutely
univalent or a periphery-sentence iﬀ for every rfg G it is the case that φ
occurs in the periphery of G whenever it occurs in G . Our earlier notions of
bivalence and univalence (Section 4.1) were relativized to a given graph G .
We will now show that if a sentence φ is bivalent (univalent) in some rfg G ,
then φ is absolutely bivalent (univalent), i.e., φ is in the core (periphery) of
every graph in which it occurs. This justiﬁes us (in subsequent sections) to
talk of univalent (bivalent) sentences simpliciter (omitting ‘absolutely’).
Corollary 4.16. The periphery of any rfg G consists exactly of those
vertices φ of G such that (∃) has a winning strategy either in GˆT (ϕ, 1) or in
GˆT (ϕ, 0).
Proof. LetG be a rfg and φ be a vertex ofG . If φ is in the periphery ofG ,
then by Lemma 4.11(2) applied to the graph Gφ , (∃) has a winning strategy
in GˆT (φ, 1) or in GˆT (φ, 0). Now suppose w.l.o.g. that (∃) has a winning
strategy in GˆT (φ, 1). Then by Lemma 4.10 there is no faithful strategy for
(∃) in GT (φ, 0). Hence φ cannot be bivalent and is therefore not in the core
of G . 
Corollary 4.17. The periphery of any rfg G consists exactly of those sen-
tences (i.e., nodes) of G that are Cantini-grounded. The 1-univalent sentences
of G are those sentences ofG that are true in the least Cantini ﬁxed point and
the 0-univalent sentences of G are those sentences of G that are false in the
least Cantini ﬁxed point.
Proof. By Proposition 4.8 and the previous corollary, the periphery con-
sists exactly of those sentences of G that are in the least ﬁxed point of
JVˆL . By Theorem 4.6, the least ﬁxed point of JVˆL consists exactly of the
Cantini-grounded sentences. 
Corollary 4.18. 1. Every sentence is either absolutely univalent or
absolutely bivalent.
2. Every absolutely univalent sentence is either absolutely 1-univalent or
absolutely 0-univalent.
Corollary 4.19. A rfg G has an empty core iﬀ for all φ ∈ V (G), φ is
Cantini-grounded.
4.4. Proof of the Fundamental Lemma. We now turn to the proof of the
Fundamental Lemma. That is: Let φ be a sentence and Φ any D-sound set
of sentences. Let 
 be an (∃)-strategy in GG (φ,Φ) and let F be a faithful,
consistent and sound set of facts with ‖F‖ = Φ.
1. There is a truth value v and a nonlosing (∃)-strategy 
∗ in GT (φ, v,F)
with ‖
∗‖ = 
.
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2. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) there are faithful decorations 
∗ and 
¯∗ of 
 such that 
∗ is a
strategy in GT (ϕ, 0,F) and 
¯∗ is a strategy in GT (ϕ, 1,F),
(b) there is neither a winning strategy  for (∃) in GˆT (ϕ, 0,F) nor in
GˆT (ϕ, 1,F) such that ‖‖  
.
Proof. Let 
 an (∃)-strategy in GG (φ,Φ). For ease of exposition, we will
only show the case whereΦ = ∅. Clearly, ∅ is aD-sound set as required by the
lemma. Note that since Φ = ∅, we must have F = ∅ as well. Obviously, F is
then a faithful, consistent and sound set of facts. Let T
 be the dependence
tree determined by 
.Wewill deﬁne a truth value assignment v : T
 → {0, 1}
by recursion on the length of s ∈ T
 . The resulting pair (T
, v) will be a
faithful fact-dependence tree for VL with root φ. This will prove part (1)
of the claim (because every fact-dependence tree corresponds to a unique
veriﬁcation strategy).
First, we need to introduce some notation. For any position (sequence)
s ∈ T
 , let (s) be the last element of s . Since T
 is a dependence tree, (s)
is a sentence. Let 
(s) be the subtree of 
 with (s) as its root. For any
s ∈ T
 let 
ˆ(s) be a well-founded fact-dependence tree for VˆL (= VFV ) with
root (s) such that ‖
ˆ(s)‖  
(s), if such a fact-dependence tree exists,
and let 
ˆ(s) be undeﬁned otherwise. Let us say that 
ˆ(s) is deﬁned for 0
if its root is ((s), 0), and that 
ˆ(s) is deﬁned for 1 if its root is ((s), 1).
Note that by Lemma 4.9, if 
ˆ(s) is deﬁned at all, it is either deﬁned for
0 or 1, but not both, because then (s) is in the least ﬁxed point of JFV .
Observe that since all well-founded fact-dependence trees are compatible,
this assignment of the values 0, 1 or ‘undeﬁned’ does not depend on the
choice of a fact-dependence tree.
We will deﬁne the decoration v of T
 in such a way that for all positions
s ∈ T
 , v(s) ‘agrees’ with 
ˆ(s) whenever the latter is deﬁned. Here, the
notion of agreement is spelled out in condition Cs below. The condition As
below will ensure that (T
, v) is indeed a fact-dependence tree for VL.
For any s ∈ T
 , let Cs , As be the following statements:
Cs : for all  ∈ out
(s): if 
ˆ(s ◦ ) is deﬁned for w, then v(s ◦) = w,
As : VL(out+
,v(s), out
−

,v(s))((s)) = v(s).
For n ≥ 0, let Cn+1, An+1 be the following statements:
Cn+1: for all s ∈ T
  n, Cs holds,
An+1: for all s ∈ T
  n, As holds.
Here, T
  n is the set of all positions of T
 of length ≤ n; s ◦ is the result
of extending the position s by the element ; out
(s) is the set of sentences
 such that s ◦  ∈ T
 and out+
,v(s) (resp. out−
,v(s)) is the set of sentences
 such that (s ◦  ∈ T
) and  has the value 1 (0) according to v. The
statements Cn+1 and An+1 can be read as ‘v restricted to ﬁrst n + 1 levels
of T
 is compatible with 
ˆ’ and ‘v restricted to ﬁrst n + 1 levels of T
 is
acceptable’ (compare An with the deﬁnition of an acceptable decoration of
an rfg). Note that the deﬁnition of As presupposes that v is already deﬁned
for all s ◦ , where  is an out-neighbour of (s) in T
 . We will deﬁne v
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by recursion on n, where in the n-th step of this procedure we suppose that
v is already deﬁned for all s ∈ T
  n and expand the domain of v to all
s ∈ T
  n + 1. Simultaneously we check, at the end of the n-th step, that
Cn+1 and An+1 hold.
Let n = 0. Then s = (). Let v(s) = u if 
ˆ(s) is deﬁned for u, and other-
wise 0. Then C1 and A1 hold trivially. Note that we could deﬁne a second
valuation v′ by setting v′(s) = u if 
ˆ(s) is deﬁned for u, and otherwise 1.
Observe that v(s) = v′(s) iﬀ 
ˆ(s) is undeﬁned. This will be important for
the proof of claim (2). However, we will only focus on the construction of v,
as the construction for v′ is completely analogous.
Now let n > 0 and s ∈ T
  n. By induction hypothesis v(s) is already
deﬁned. We shall deﬁne v(s ◦) for all ∈ out
(s) in such a way thatCs,As
hold. From this Cn+1, An+1 will follow.
Let Ψ+ be the set of all  ∈ out
(s) such that 
ˆ(s ◦) is deﬁned for 1, let
Ψ− be the set of all  ∈ out
(s) such that 
ˆ(s ◦ ) is deﬁned for 0, and let
Ψ⊥ be the set of all  ∈ out
(s) such that 
ˆ(s ◦ ) is undeﬁned.
Case 1. 
ˆ(s) is deﬁned for w ′ ∈ {0, 1}. Then VˆL(Ψ+,Ψ−)((s)) = w ′.
Deﬁne v(s ◦ ) = 1, if  ∈ Ψ+ and v(s ◦ ) = 0, if  ∈ Ψ− ∪ Ψ⊥. This
yields Cs .
Since (s) depends on out
(s), VL(Ψ+,Ψ− ∪ Ψ⊥)((s)) = w ∈ {0, 1}.
Since VˆL is monotonic and at least as strong asVL (Lemma 4.4) we getw =
w ′. On the other hand, by induction hypothesis Cn we have v(s) = w = w ′.
The monotonicity of VL implies As .
Case 2. 
ˆ(s) is undeﬁned. Let us prove the following claim:
(∗) There is some (Φ+,Φ−) ⊇ (Ψ+,Ψ−) with Φ+ ∪ Φ− = out
(s)
and VL(Φ+,Φ−)((s)) = v(s).
Proof. Suppose w.l.o.g. v(s) = 0. Assume that there is no such
(Φ+,Φ−)⊇ (Ψ+,Ψ−) withΦ+∪ Φ− = out
(s) andVL(Φ+,Φ−)((s))= 0.
Since (s) depends on out
(s), for all partial models (Φ+,Φ−) with
Φ+ ∪Φ− ⊇ out
(s) we obtain VL(Φ+,Φ−)((s))= VL(Φ+ ∩ out
(s),Φ− ∩
out
(s))((s)), by Lemma 2.16. (Observe that in order to apply Lemma
2.16 it is essential that VL is symmetric. We will give a detailed discussion of
the role of symmetry in ﬁnding faithful decorations in Section 4.6.)
Hence by assumption there is no partial model (Φ+,Φ−) ⊇ (Ψ+,Ψ−)
with VL(Φ+,Φ−)((s)) = 0. But this means by deﬁnition of VˆL that
VˆL(Ψ+,Ψ−)((s)) = 1. But 
ˆ(s ◦ ) is deﬁned for all  such that
 ∈ Ψ+∪Ψ−. Hence for each ∈ Ψ+∪Ψ− there is a v∗ : 
(s ◦)→ {0, 1}
such that (
(s ◦ ), v∗) is a fact-dependence tree for VˆL with root . Let
v∗ = (
⋃
∈Ψ+∪Ψ− v
∗
) ∪ ((s), 1), and let (s) be the set of all t ∈ 
(s) such
that t = ((s)) or t(2) ∈ Ψ+ ∪ Ψ−, where t(2) is the second element of t.
Then ((s), v∗) is a well-founded fact-dependence tree for VˆL with root (s),
and ‖((s), v∗)‖  
(s). Hence 
ˆ(s) is deﬁned for 1. Contradiction. 
Deﬁne v(s ◦ ) = 1, if  ∈ Φ+ and v(s ◦ ) = 0, if  ∈ Φ−. Then (∗)
immediately yields Cs and As . So v(s ◦ ) is deﬁned for all  ∈ out
(s).
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Since we have chosen s arbitrarily and any t ∈ T
  n + 1 is of the form
s ◦, v(t) is deﬁned for all t ∈ T
  n + 1. Hence Cn+1 and An+1 follow.
In this process of recursive deﬁnition we ﬁnally get a function v : T
 →
{0, 1} and by inductionCn,An hold for every n. Clearly, from ∀n ∈  : An it
follows that (T
, v) is a fact-dependence tree for VL with root ϕ. Moreover
(T
, v) is a faithful fact-dependence tree: our construction process provides
an (∃)-answer to any (∀)-move whatsoever. This proves claim (1) of the
theorem. Analogously, (T
, v′) is also is a faithful fact-dependence tree for
VL with root ϕ.
Now for claim (2). By our deﬁnition of the valuations v and v′ we obtain
v = v′ iﬀ there is no well-founded fact-dependence tree ∗ for VˆL such that
‖∗‖  
. This proves (b) ⇒ (a). Now suppose (a). Assume that there is
winning strategy  for (∃) in GˆT (ϕ, 0) such that ‖‖  
. Then, by Lemma
4.10, there is no faithful strategy for (∃) in GT (φ, 1). But this contradicts
(a). Analogously, the assumption that there is a winning strategy  for (∃)
in GˆT (ϕ, 1) such that ‖‖  
 leads to a contradiction. 
4.5. Paradoxicality and a graph’s structural properties. Aside from its
rather philosophical meaning hinted at above, Corollary 4.12 allows us
(together with Theorem 3.9) to identify certain structural properties that all
rfgs of a sentence share as necessary condition for its paradoxicality: Since
there is always a faithful multidecoration of any rfg Gφ , the paradoxicality
of φ must be due to the fact that all of the faithful multidecorations of all
the rfgs of φ are inconsistent. But the property of lacking a faithful consis-
tent multidecoration can be related to a graph’s structural properties rather
easily. In order to state these results, we need to introduce the following
graph-theoretic notions. A graph G is a tree iﬀ it there is some r ∈ V (G)
such that for every x ∈ V (G) there is a unique walk from r to x. We call r
the root of G . Note that the root of a tree is uniquely determined, so we can
conceive any tree in a canonical way as an accessible pointed graph. A double
path is a graph consisting of two paths originating both from the same ver-
tex and rejoining in a diﬀerent vertex, not touching each other in between.
More precisely, a graph D is called a double path (from a to b) iﬀ there are
nontrivial paths P1, P2 from a to b such that V (P1) ∩ V (P2) = {a, b} and
V (D) = V (P1) ∪ V (P2) and A(D) = A(P1) ∪A(P2).
φ 
Example of a double path between ϕ and .
The proof of the following useful lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 4.20. Let G be an apg. Then the following claims are equivalent:
1. G is a tree.
2. The map that collapses the unfolding of G onto G is a bijection.
3. G contains neither a cycle nor a double path.
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Corollary 4.21. If a sentence ϕ has a reference graph that is a tree, then
ϕ is not r-paradoxical.
Proof. Let G be a rfg of φ which is a tree. Let 
 be an (∃)-strategy in
the grounding game such that Γ(
) = G . By Theorem 4.12, there is a truth
value v and an (∃)-strategy 
∗ in the game GT (φ, v) such that 
∗ is a faithful
decoration of 
. Let F be the set of all facts occurring in 
∗. Since G is a
tree, no sentence  occurring in 
∗ can occur in both contexts (, 1) and
(, 0). Thus, 
 is consistent. By Theorem 3.9, ϕ has the deﬁnite truth value
v in some ﬁxed point. 
Corollary 4.22. If a sentence is r-paradoxical, then each of its rfgs
contains a directed cycle or a double path.12
Now let us turn to the classiﬁcation problem for dangerous graphs. First, we
can formulate and prove in our framework the following result of Rabern et
al. [16]:
Theorem 4.23. A ﬁnite rfg is dangerous iﬀ it contains a directed cycle.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows from Corollary 3.3. For the
other direction, one ﬁrst shows that a graph is dangerous iﬀ some subgraph
of it is dangerous. Rabern et al. [16, Lemma 2] have proved that for their
own framework, and the proof can be adapted to our own framework as
well. Now, suppose that G contains a directed cycle. Then, by the previous
remark, we can simply assume that G is a directed cycle, let’s say of length
n. But then G is isomorphic to an rfg of a liar cycle of length n. 
It is worth noticing that while the directed cycle is the reference pattern
underlying the liar family, the double path is underlying any member of the
Yablo sequence. However, it can be shown that if ϕ has an rfg with no cycles
and only ﬁnitely many double paths, then ϕ is not r-paradoxical. Unlike
cycles, double paths must come in ﬂocks in order to make an rfg dangerous.
Conjecture 4.24. A reference graph is dangerous iﬀ it contains a sub-
division of the liar-graph as a subgraph or the Yablo-graph as a ﬁnitary
minor.13
12Shortly before ﬁnishing this article it came to our attention that Jongeling et al. [12]
have a theorem apparently mirroring the above one. (They call ‘double reference’ what we
call ‘double path’.) However, there are quite a few diﬀerences between their result and ours.
First, they deﬁne ‘double reference’ only for a fragment of their (propositional) language,
a restriction that probably could be dispensed with if they gave a rigorous deﬁnition of
reference graph (which they don’t). But the essential diﬀerence is that their language (the
fact that it is a propositional language is not so important) contains only propositional
variables but no propositional constants (unlike the language in Rabern et al. [16]). This
is a substantial restriction which amounts to banning atomic sentences from the language
entirely and which makes the proof of their version of the theoremmuch easier. In particular,
it renders superﬂuous to prove something analogous to our Fundamental Lemma, since there
is no such a thing as an unfaithful truth-value assignment in such a framework.
13For the notion of aminor in the context of digraphs consult the Appendix. Intuitively, the
minor-relation is a more liberal form of the subgraph-relation that allows that connected sets
of vertices can be contracted. By ﬁnitary we mean that any set of vertices that is contracted
to one vertex must be ﬁnite.
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This conjecture is motivated by an attempt to make the notion of a graph
containing many double paths precise: An acyclic graph should contain the
Yablo-graph as a ﬁnitary minor iﬀ it deviates considerably from being a tree
in the sense that it contains many double paths. This conjecture, if correct,
implies that in some sense every r-paradoxical sentence is reducible either to
the liar or the Yablo paradox.
4.6. Symmetry revisited. Now let us adopt again the more abstract point
of view on valuation schemes already discussed in Section 2.6. At this
point we are in a better position to fully appreciate the importance of
our valuation schemes being symmetric for this kind of structural analy-
sis of the paradoxes. Recall that for an arbitrary valuation scheme V a
sentence φ V -depends on S iﬀ there is a partition (S+, S−) of S such that
V (S+, S−)(φ) ∈ {0, 1} and that V is called symmetric iﬀ V -dependence of
φ on S implies that V (S+, S−)(φ) ∈ {0, 1} for all partitions (S+, S−) of S.
In the following we will have a look at two sentences that violate symmetry
with respect to Strong Kleene valuation. First, consider a sentence  such
that  ↔ (¬T ∨ T1 = 0) and the following two graphs:
 1=0  1=0
The ﬁrst graph is an rfg for  under both VSK and VL; however, under VSK ,
this rfg is not canonical, because the second graph is also an rfg for  (observe
that VSK({1 = 0}, ∅)() = 1 ). So we have a well-founded but nevertheless
dangerous VSK-rfg. Hence, the theorems of the previous sections do not
hold for VSK . Let us have a closer look at what goes wrong here. The
(∃)-strategy 
 that corresponds to the unfolding of the last rfg looks like this:
(∃) responds to  by {1 = 0} and to 1 = 0 by ∅, which is a winning strategy
for her in the grounding game. The VSK analogue to the Fundamental
Lemma would yield a v ∈ {0, 1} and a nonlosing strategy 
∗ for (∃) in
GT (, v) that is a decoration of 
. Let’s check whether this holds.
First recall that Proposition 2.14 fails for VSK (indeed VSK(∅, {1 =
0})() = 12 , but (N, ∅) |= ), so the rules for the VSK -veriﬁction game
must formulated analogous to the case of VˆL—otherwise (∃) could come up
with a winning strategy in GT (, 1) which would defy Theorem 3.9. Suppose
the game starts in the veriﬁcation mode. (∃) cannot play (1 = 0, 0) since
VSK(∅, {1 = 0})() = 12, so her only move is (1 = 0, 1). But playing so loses
the game because (∃) cannot respond to (∀)’s move 1 = 0. By the same rea-
soning, the only possible strategy for (∃) in GT (, 0) is a losing strategy. So
the Fundamental Lemma (and its corollaries) fail under VSK due to its lack
of symmetry. This means that the paradoxicality of  cannot be captured by
the structural property that all of its rfgs have a loop—it is rather reﬂected by
the fact each of its rfgs has a loop or no faithful multidecoration. But this last
property is not structural, i.e., not preserved under graph isomorphism. So
symmetry is essential to make paradoxicality visible in the rfg of a sentence.
One may suspect that a way out of this dilemma would be to work with a
modiﬁed notion of V -dependence. For instance, let φ V -depend on S iﬀ for
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every partition (S+, S−) of S V (S+, S−)(φ) ∈ {0, 1}. Wouldn’t that make
V symmetric with respect to this notion of dependence? In a certain way it
would. However, now we have a diﬀerent problem. Consider the sentence
 ∨ T1 = 1 (cf. Section 2.6). This sentence is in the least ﬁxed point,
since VSK({1 = 1}, ∅)( ∨ T1 = 1) = 1, but under the new notion of
dependence it has no loop-free rfg! So while in the ﬁrst example with the
original notion of dependence we failed to read oﬀ the paradoxicality of a
sentence from some rfg, with the modiﬁed notion of dependence we fail to
recognize a grounded sentence, bothdue to a lackof symmetry.However, this
doesn’t mean that nonsymmetric valuation schemes are simply unaccessible
for some generalisation of our methods, just that such a generalisation is
not that straightforward. This, however, will be left for future research.
4.7. The core-graph. We call the subgraph of an rfg G induced by its core
the core-graph of G and the subgraph induced by its periphery its periphery-
graph. The aim of this section is to prove a sharper version of the main result
of Section 4.5: paradoxicality is due to the existence of a cycle or double
path in the core-graph. Such a more precise localisation will be of great
importance in Section 5, where we will introduce the distinction between
positive and negative arcs of an rfg—its syntactic signature. The reason is
that the syntactic signature, although its restriction to the periphery-graph
may show some strange behaviour, its restriction to the core graph will give
us valuable semantic information on the rfg.
Let us start with the following simple observation: Call a graphG sinkless
iﬀ G is nonempty and every vertex of G has an out-neighbour.
Proposition 4.25. The core-graph of any rfg is empty or sinkless.
Proof. Let C be the core-graph of G and let  be a vertex of C . Suppose
 has no out-neighbour (in C ). Then  depends on the periphery of G .
Hence  is univalent. Contradiction. 
In Section 3.2 we have deﬁned the function Γ which collapses each
(∃)-strategy 
 in the veriﬁcation game (with an empty set parameter) to
an rfg G = Γ(
), inducing a multidecoration on G . Since we have already
seen that paradoxicality is related closely to the core, it looks promising to
develop a tool that allows us to decorate the core-graph independently: if
there is some obstruction to a consistent decoration in the structure of G , it
should be located entirely in the core-graph and not arise from some inter-
action between core and periphery. To this end let us expand the collapsing
operator Γ to games with an arbitrary parameter.
Let Φ be a set of sentences and let 
 be an (∃)-strategy in the grounding
game GG (φ,Φ). Deﬁne the rfg Γ(
) associated to 
 as follows: The set of
vertices of Γ(
) consists of the sentences occurring in 
; two vertices , 	
are joined by an arc from  to 	 iﬀ (φ, . . . , ,Ψ, 	) ∈ 
 for some Ψ, i.e., if
there is a run of the game (played according to 
) in which (∀) chooses , 	
consecutively. Note that if Φ = ∅, a strategymay have the form {()}, where ()
denotes the empty sequence. This is exactly the case if (∀) cannot make a ﬁrst
move, i.e., if φ ∈ Φ. An analogous situation occurs in the veriﬁcation game
GT (φ, v, (Φ+,Φ−)). But here the empty strategy is not necessarily a winning
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strategy: it is winning iﬀ φ is in the component of (Φ+,Φ−) indicated by v,
otherwise it is a losing strategy.
Definition 4.26. A set B ⊆ V (G) is called a basis of G iﬀ for each
x ∈ V (G) there is a unique b ∈ B such that x is accessible from b.
In particular, two diﬀerent elements of a basis are not accessible from one
another. As a preparation for the following, deﬁne for any set of sentences
Φ and any GG(·, ·)-strategy  a set of sequences cut(,Φ) = {cut(p,Φ) |
p ∈ }, where cut(p,Φ) = p if no member of Φ occurs in p as a (∀)-move,
and otherwise let cut(p,Φ) = ∅. So cut(,Φ) can be thought of as cutting
oﬀ every branch of the strategy tree  at the ﬁrst occurrence of somemember
of Φ. Cutting a strategy by Φ yields, under certain conditions, a strategy in
the game relative to Φ:
Lemma 4.27. Let 
 be an (∃)-strategy in GG (φ,Φ) and let Ψ ⊇ Φ with
φ /∈ Ψ. Then cut(
,Ψ) is an (∃)-strategy in GG(φ,Ψ).
Let G∗[b] denote the graph induced by the set of all  ∈ V (G) accessible
from b. Let C = (C+, C−) be the least Cantini ﬁxed point.
Lemma 4.28. Let G be an rfg and A its core.
1. A has a basis B .
2. for each φ ∈ B there is a unique (∃)-strategy 
φ in GG(φ, ‖C‖) such that

φ corresponds to the unfolding of A∗[φ].
Proof. Ad (1): For x, y ∈ V (A) we write x ≤ y iﬀ x = y or there is
a walk in A from x to y. We write x ≡ y iﬀ x ≤ y and y ≤ x. Observe
that x ≡ y iﬀ x = y or there is a cycle X ⊆ A such that x ∈ V (X ) and
y ∈ V (X ).
The relation ≤ induces a partial ordering ≤˜ on the set V˜ (A) of
≡-equivalence classes of V (A). Observe that <˜ is a well-founded relation,
i.e., has no inﬁnite descending chain. (A ⊆ G and G has a root.) Let B˜
the set of all elements of V˜ (A) that are minimal with respect to <˜. Then
for all b0 = b1 ∈ B˜ : b0 ˜≤ b1 and b1 ˜≤ b0. On the other hand let x ∈ V˜ (A).
Then there is some b ∈ B˜ with b ≤˜x: For either {y |y <˜ x} = ∅. In this
case x ∈ B˜ and thus b = x ≤˜x. Or there is some <˜-minimal element b of
{y |y <˜ x} and b ∈ B˜ . Let B ⊆ V (A) be a set of representatives of B˜ . It
follows that B is a basis of A.
Ad (2): Let φ ∈ B ⊆ A. Then there is a unique (∃)-strategy φ in GG(φ, ∅)
that corresponds to the unfolding of G∗[φ]. Deﬁne 
φ = cut(φ, ‖C‖). Then

φ is an (∃)-strategy φ inGG (φ, ‖C‖). Since byCorollary 4.17 ‖C‖ is identical
with the periphery of G and G is decomposed into core and periphery by
Corollary 4.13, 
φ corresponds to the unfolding of A∗[φ]. 
Now let us transfer the key-concept of the unfolding of an rfg to the core-
graph. A core-graph has not necessarily a root, but as shown above it always
has a basis which just plays the role of generalized root: Let G be an rfg and
B a basis of the core-graph C of G . Let ΣB(G) =
⋃{
φ |φ ∈ B}, where

φ is deﬁned as in Lemma 4.28. We call ΣB (G) the strategy-unfolding of C
relative toB . In game-theoretic terms, ΣB(G) can be thought of as a strategy
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in a game that consists of the games GG (φb, ‖C‖) (for each φb ∈ B) being
played simultaneously, where (∃) wins the composite game iﬀ she wins each
component, and (∀) wins iﬀ he wins one component. Due to lack of space
we shall not work out this idea but simply conceive of ΣB(G) as an unfolding
of a graph with potentially more than one root.
In order to prove our main result of this section we want to provide a
consistent and faithful to the strategy unfolding of a core-graph with no
cycles and double paths. The following concepts will be needed in the below
theorem but the will also play a key role in Section 5. Call a set of facts
F a veriﬁer (falsiﬁer) for φ iﬀ VL(F)(φ) = 1 (VL(F)(φ) = 0). A veriﬁer
(falsiﬁer) is called faithful iﬀ for all (, v) ∈ F : if  is u-univalent then
v = u.
Lemma 4.29. A univalent sentence has either a faithful veriﬁer or a faithful
falsiﬁer, but not both.
Proof. W.l.o.g. let φ be 1-univalent. Then Lemma 4.11 yields a faithful
strategy 
 for (∃) in the game GT (φ, 1). Then (∃)’s ﬁrst 
-move is a faithful
veriﬁer F for φ. Now assume that there is also a faithful falsiﬁer F ′ for φ.
But then an application of Lemma 4.11 to each element of F ′ yields a
faithful falsifying strategy for φ, in addition to the faithful verifying strategy
provided by the ﬁrst application. 
The main result of this section is a sharper version of Corollary 4.22:
Theorem 4.30. If the core-graph of an rfgG contains no directed cycle and
no double path, then G has an acceptable decoration.
Proof. Let G be an rfg such that the core-graph C of G contains neither
a directed cycle nor a double path. Let φ be the root of G . Let 
 be the
strategy that is induced by the unfolding of G . Let B be a basis for C and
 = ΣR(G). B is at most countable, since our language is countable.
Let (n)n∈κ be an enumeration of B , (so κ ≤ ). Denote by n the
component of  that has root n. Thus n is a strategy in GG(n, ‖C‖) by
the deﬁnition of  and Lemma 4.28(2). (Again, C denotes the least Cantini
ﬁxed point.) By recursion on n we will deﬁne sequences (∗n )n<κ, (vn)n<κ,
and (Fn)n<κ such that
• Fn is a faithful, consistent and sound set of facts,
• ∗n is a consistent nonlosing (∃)-strategy in GT (n, vn,Fn),
• F∗n ∩ Fn = ∅, and
• ∗n is a decoration of cut(n, ‖Fn‖).
Recall that F∗n denotes the set of all facts (, v) such that  is a (∀)-moves
that occurs in ∗n and v is the mode that the game assumes after  has been
played. Let n = 0. PutF0 = C. ThenF0 is a faithful, consistent and sound set
of facts. An application of Lemma 4.11(1) to the GG(0, C+ ∪ C−)-strategy
0 yields a v and a nonlosing GT (0, v, (C+, C−))-strategy ∗0 . But ∗0 is also
consistent: C0 is an apg and 0 is the strategy induced by its unfolding.
Since C contains no directed cycle and no double path, Lemma 4.20 yields
that the map that collapses 0 and thus ∗0 to C0 is a bijection. Hence 
∗
0 is
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consistent. Moreover, F∗0 ∩ F0 = ∅ (by deﬁnition of strategy), and since ∗0
is a nonlosing strategy, it is a decoration of 0 = cut(0, ‖F0‖).
Now let n > 0. Put Fn = Fn−1 ∪ F∗n−1 . By induction hypothesis, Fn−1 is
a faithful consistent and sound set of facts. ∗n−1 is a consistent nonlosing
strategy. Fn is a faithful set of facts; hence, F∗n−1 is a faithful consistent and
sound set of facts. Since F∗n−1 ∩ Fn−1 = ∅, Fn is also a faithful, consistent
and sound set of facts. Since n is a GG(n, ‖F0‖)-strategy, Fn ⊇ F0 and
n /∈ ‖Fn‖ (since B is a basis), we can apply Lemma 4.27 to obtain that
cut(n, ‖Fn‖) is a GG(n, ‖Fn‖)-strategy. Thus an application of Lemma
4.11(1) to cut(n, ‖Fn‖) yields a v and a nonlosing GT (0, v,Fn)-strategy ∗n
which is a decoration of cut(n, ‖Fn‖). By deﬁnition of a strategy, we obtain
that F∗n ∩ Fn = ∅. The consistency of ∗n is proved completely analogously
to the case n = 0.
Let Fκ =
⋃
n<κ Fn. Since the sequence (Fn)n<κ is monotonic and each Fn
is faithful and consistent, Fκ is also faithful and consistent. Moreover,
(∗) for each  ∈ V (G) there exists a unique u such that (, u) ∈ Fκ.
The uniqueness part of the claim follows from the consistency of Fκ. Since
 = ΣR(G) and C = Γ(ΣB(G)) by deﬁnition, the existence part follows for
bivalent  from the fact that for all n, ∗n is a decoration of cut(n, ‖Fn‖)
and  =
⋃
n<κ cut(n, ‖Fn‖) (by deﬁnition  =
⋃
n<κ n and if any 	 does
occur in n but not in cut(n, ‖Fn‖) then there is some k < n such that 	
occurs in k). For univalent  it follows from the fact that C ⊆ Fκ.
Deﬁne a truth value v0 by stipulating that v0 = u iﬀ (φ, u) occurs in Fκ.
Due to (∗) , v is well deﬁned. Now let us deﬁne ∗ as follows: Let (, v) be
an (∀)-move in GT (φ, v0). Let Ψ the 
-answer to . Let (F+κ ∩Ψ,F−κ ∩Ψ))
be the ∗-response to (, v). We claim that ∗ is a faithful and consistent
(∃)-strategy in GT (φ, v0). Since Fκ is a consistent set of facts, ∗ is a consis-
tent strategy if it is a strategy at all. Moreover, it is a faithful strategy, if it
is a strategy at all: (∃) has a response to any (∀)-move whatsoever. In order
to establish that ∗ is indeed a strategy we have to show, for each (∀)-move
(, v), that the following holds for the (∃)-response (F+κ ∩Ψ,F−κ ∩Ψ):
(i)  depends on ‖(F+κ ∩Ψ,F−κ ∩Ψ)‖,
(ii) (F+κ ∩ Ψ,F−κ ∩ Ψ) is a veriﬁer for  if v = 1 and a falsiﬁer for  if
v = 0.
Claim (i) is clear. In order to prove (ii), let n be the least number such that
(, v) ∈ Fn.
Case 1. n = 0. Then  is univalent. Because of (i) (F+κ ∩Ψ,F−κ ∩Ψ) is
either an veriﬁer or a falsiﬁer for . If v = 1 it cannot be a falsiﬁer because
of Lemma 4.29 (since a faithful veriﬁer exists in this case). So it must be a
veriﬁer. Likewise it follows that it is a falsiﬁer if v = 0.
Case 2. n > 0. Then  is bivalent. Then ∗n−1 is a (∃)-strategy in
GT (n, vn,Fn−1) which contains a response E of (∃) to (, v) (because ∗n−1
is a nonlosing strategy). But E = (F+κ ∩ Ψ,F−κ ∩ Ψ)). To see this observe
that it follows from (∗) that ‖E‖ = Ψ = ‖(F+κ ∩ Ψ,F−κ ∩ Ψ)‖. From this
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follows the claimed identity because F+κ is consistent. But this proves (ii),
since E is a veriﬁer of (, v) if v = 1, and a falsiﬁer if v = 0. 
The main purpose of the above theorem is its application in Section 5.
There we will provide a ‘signed’ version of it (Theorem 5.10). It is crucial to
formulate and prove Theorem 5.10 in the ‘core-graph version’ rather than in
the ‘absolute version’ because its proof involves Theorem 5.9 which has no
‘absolute’ counterpart (cf. the example discussed at length in Section 5.1).
However, Theorem 4.30 can also be applied to identify rfgs of nonpara-
doxical sentences that elude Corollary 4.22. Take the example given right
after Proposition 4.3. The canonical rfg of φ0 is nonwell-founded and con-
tains inﬁnitelymany double paths. Its core graph (since it is empty!) contains
none of them. This is a rather trivial example because here the core is empty,
but it can easily be modiﬁed: take some rfg T0 that is a nonwell-founded tree
but has inﬁnitely many sinks (nodes with no successor). LetT1 arise fromT0
by replacing each sink ofT0 by some φn of the just discussed counterexample
to Proposition 4.3. Then T1 has a nonempty core iﬀ T0 has a nonempty core
(which can easily be achieved) and T1 is nonwell-founded (in an even more
intricate way than T0) and it has inﬁnitely many double paths. But since
the core-graph of T1 is contained in the subgraph corresponding to T0, it
contains no double path and no cycle. Hence by Theorem 4.30, T1 has an
acceptable decoration.
Before proceeding to Section 5, let us recall that all our results in this arti-
cle (except some in Section 5), in particular the above theorem, do not only
hold for the Leitgeb valuation schemeVL but also for any standard symmet-
ric valuation schemes whose dependence relation is weakly compositional
(cf. Section 2.6), such as the Weak Kleene scheme. Theorem 4.6 (together
with the Corollaries 4.13 and 4.17) ensures that the core has some kind
of ‘transvaluational’ absoluteness property: suppose GWKφ is some Weak-
Kleene rfg of φ while GLφ is a Leitgeb rfg. Let  be any vertex occurring in
both graphs (certainly φ is such a vertex). Then  is in the core of GWKφ iﬀ
it is in the core of GLφ , because by Theorem 4.6 the core nodes of G
WK
φ are
the sentences of GWKφ that are not in the least Cantini ﬁxed point—and the
same holds true for GLφ . This means, in the light of Theorem 4.30, that the
stronger valuation scheme VL does not make VWK -paradoxical sentences
nonparadoxical by shifting sentences from the core to the periphery but
rather by cutting sentences out from the core, and with them the dangerous
reference patterns (cycle and double path) that lie in the core. For example,
 ∨ ¬ is paradoxical relative to VWK but not to VL. The disjunction VWK -
depends on the liar, which lies in the core, but the disjunction VL-depends
on the empty set. In the next section wewill see that not all cycles and double
paths in the core are equally dangerous but that danger depends on the sign
of its arcs.
§5. Signed reference graphs. The introduction of signed rfgs seems to us
to be of great importance for a full understanding of paradoxicality. As
we mentioned earlier, the canonical (unsigned) rfg of the liar is identical
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with the canonical (unsigned) rfg of the truth-teller. But while the liar is
clearly paradoxical, the truth-teller is not. As Herzberger pointed out, both
sentences suﬀer from some form of semantic regress. In our framework, this
is captured by the fact that all of their (unsigned) rfgs contain a directed
cycle as a subgraph. However, what distinguishes the liar from the truth-
teller, and makes the former paradoxical, is that the liar makes a ‘negative’
statement about itself, claiming itself to be false, while the truth-teller makes
a ‘positive’ statement about itself, claiming itself to be true. Accordingly,
we should label the rfg of the liar with a ‘+’ and the rfg of the truth-teller
with a ‘−’. One obvious way to make the distinction between ‘positive’
and ‘negative’ precise is by syntactic analysis of the sentence: the liar is
a T -negative sentence, while the truth teller is T -positive. One problem
with this account is that it does not cover all rfgs. Another problem is that
there seems to be no obvious method to link patterns of syntactic graph
signatures to (the lack of) acceptable decorations. Our approach in this
section is to introduce in addition to the notion of syntactic signature the
notion of a semantic signature. A semantic signature is an arc labelling which
is induced by an (∃)-strategy in the veriﬁcation game. Our main result states
that for a large class of rfgs G there is a semantic signature (induced by a
faithful veriﬁcation strategy) which matches the syntactic signature on the
core-graph of G . This provides us with a method to ﬁnd conditions for the
existence of acceptable decorations in terms of a graph’s syntactic signature.
This gives us more nuanced existence results than those in the previous
sections.
Remark. This section contains some results that cannot automatically be
transferred to other standard symmetric valuation schemes whose depen-
dence relation is weakly compositional. The results that cannot be trans-
ferred are Lemma 5.8, Theorem 5.9, its three corollaries, and Theorem 5.15.
However, it is not hard to see that Lemma 5.8, Theorem 5.9, and its three
corollaries, do hold, e.g., for the Weak Kleene scheme.
5.1. Syntactic and semantic signature. A signature S on an rfgG is a map
from the set of arcs of G to the set of labels {+,−,⊥}. Call S coherent if
its set of labels is {+,−}, call it positive if its set of labels is {+}, negative if
its set of labels is {−}. Call a sentence ϕ T -positive iﬀ every occurrence of
the truth predicate in ϕ is in the scope of an even number of negation signs.
Call a sentence ϕ T -negative iﬀ every occurrence of the truth predicate in ϕ
is in the scope of an odd number of negation signs. (This deﬁnition assumes
that the material conditional → is not among the primitive symbols but
deﬁned in terms of negation and disjunction.) Call an rfg G pure iﬀ every
vertex of G that contains the T -symbol is either T -positive or T -negative.
Call G mainly pure iﬀ every vertex in the core of G is either T -positive or
T -negative. Call (G,S) mainly coherent (negative, positive) iﬀ S is coherent
(negative, positive) on the core-graph of G . We will now describe a method
for assigning labels to the arcs of rfgs based on the syntactic shape of their
nodes, followed by a method to label arcs of an rfg according to certain
semantic properties.
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Definition 5.1. Let G be an rfg.
1. Suppose G is pure. The syntactic signature of G is the signature that
assigns to an arc a of G the label ‘+’ if the tail of a is T -positive
(and not arithmetical) and the label ‘−’ if the tail of a is T -negative
(and not arithmetical). (If the tail of a is arithmetical it is assigned the
label ‘⊥’.)14
2. Let G be a mainly pure rfg. The syntactic core-signature of G is
the signature that is deﬁned on any arc of the core-graph of G
just like the syntactic signature and that assigns any arc not in
the core-graph the symbol ‘⊥’.
Definition 5.2. We deﬁne a semantically signed rfg as follows. Let T be a
fact-dependence tree andG the rfg thatT collapses into. Let (φ,) be an arc
of G . We put a ‘+’ on the arc if there is a sequence s and truth values vφ, v
such that (φ, vφ) is the last element of s , s ◦ (, v) is in T , and vφ = v.
We put a ‘–’ on the arc if there is a sequence s and truth values vφ, v such
that (φ, vφ) is the last element of s , s ◦ (, v) is in T , and vφ = v. We put
a ‘⊥’ on the arc if both of the former conditions are satisﬁed.
Alternatively, we may give the following equivalent deﬁnition. Let 
 be
a veriﬁcation strategy and G be the rfg that 
 collapses into. Let (φ,) be
an arc of G . We put a ‘+’ on this arc if there is a run of the game in which
(∀) choses φ, consecutively without changing the mode of the game. We
put a ‘–’ on this arc if there is a run of the game in which (∀) choses φ,
consecutively with a change in the mode of the game. We put a ‘⊥’ on the
arc if both of the former conditions are satisﬁed.
A pair (G,S) is a semantically signed rfg iﬀ S is a signature on G induced
by some veriﬁcation strategy on G . We call (G,S) and S faithful iﬀ the
inducing strategy is faithful.
There are sentences ϕ such that there is no faithful (∃)-strategy 
 in GT (ϕ, v)
such that the induced semantically signed rfg is coherent. For example, let 
be a sentence such that  ↔ ¬T∨¬T1 = 1. Then  has no faithful and
coherent signed rfg. To see this, note that  depends essentially on {, 1 = 1}.
Consider the following schema which describes all possible (∃)-responses to
(∀)-moves in GT (, v), assuming that (∃) plays some strategy 
∗ that is a
decoration of the canonical strategy 
 in GG():
1. (, 0)→ {(, 1), (1 = 1, 1)},
2. (, 1)→ {(, 0), (1 = 1, 1)},
3. (, 1)→ {(, 0), (1 = 1, 0)},
4. (, 1)→ {(, 1), (1 = 1, 0)}.
Observe that 
∗ is unfaithful whenever (3) or (4) occur in 
∗. So assume
that neither (3) or (4) occur in 
∗. But then both (1) and (2) must occur in

∗ alternatingly: whenever (∃) plays (1) in one move she must play (2) in
her next move and vice versa.
14This case is rather unusual, since any rfg that contains an arithmetical sentence with an
out-neighbour is obviously redundant.
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(, 0)
{(, 1), (1 = 1, 1)}
(, 1) (1 = 1, 1)
∅{(, 0), (1 = 1, 1)}
(, 0) (1 = 1, 1)
∅. . . 
1 = 1
⊥
−
A faithful (∃)-strategy for  and the induced graph.
But this means that in the semantically signed rfg induced by 
∗, the arc
leading from  to 1 = 1 must bear both labels ‘+’ and ‘−’. Since any
(∃)-strategy in GT (, v) has a decoration of 
 as a substrategy it follows
that there is no faithful and coherent semantically signed rfg for . Further
observe that 
∗ is inconsistent as soon as (1) or (2) occur in it. Hence by
Theorem 3.9,  is paradoxical. Observe, however, that if the semantically
signed rfg of  is induced by a faithful strategy, then the incoherent arcs
are not in the core-graph. In the next subsection we will show that for a
large class of rfgs there exists a semantic signature that is coherent on the
core (Theorem 5.9). Note that every consistent strategy induces a coherent
semantic signature.
The next theorems deal with some special cases where we obtain faithful
and coherent semantic signatures.
Theorem 5.3. 1. Every nonr-paradoxical sentence has an rfg that has a
faithful and coherent semantic signature.
2. Every well-founded rfg has a unique faithful and coherent semantic
signature.
Proof. Ad 1: If φ is not paradoxical then there is a consistent veriﬁcation
strategy. Ad 2: Follows from Corollary 3.6. 
Theorem 5.4. Let (G,S) be a faithful and mainly coherent semantically
signed rfg. Suppose further that the core-graph of (G,S) has only cycles and
double paths with an even number of negative arcs. Then every strategy that
induces (G,S) is acceptable.
Proof. Suppose there is some strategy 
 that induces (G,S) and 
 is not
acceptable. By Corollary 4.30 the core-graph ofG must contain a cycleC or
a double path D. Since 
 is faithful by assumption, it must be inconsistent.
Moreover, the node  where the inconsistency occurs must lie, in the ﬁrst
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case, somewhere on C or, in the second case, at the end of D (at the point
where both paths meet).
Case 1. Let C consist of the nodes  = 0, . . . , n = , with  being the
point of inconsistency of C . W.l.o.g. let ((0, 0), . . . , (n, 1)) be a sequence
corresponding toC in the unfolding ofG . Since the truth value of0 is 0 and
the truth value ofn is 1, and sinceC only contains positive or negative arcs
(because (G,S) is mainly coherent), there must be an odd number of truth
value changes on the walk from 0 to n. But this implies that C consists
of an odd number of negative arcs. This contradicts our assumptions.
Case 2. LetD0 andD1 be the two paths thatD consists of. Let 0, . . . , n
and ϕ0, . . . , ϕm be the nodes of D0 and D1, respectively, where 0 = ϕ0 and
 = n = ϕm. W.l.o.g. let ((0, 0), . . . , (n, 0)) and ((ϕ0, 0), . . . , (ϕm, 1)) be
sequences corresponding to D0 and D1, respectively, in the dependence tree
of G . But this means that D0 consists of an even number of negative arcs
while D1 consists of an odd number of arcs. Hence D consists of an odd
number of arcs. This contradicts our assumption. 
5.2. Matching syntactic and semantic signature. The following lemmata
are needed to prove the main result of this section, Theorem 5.9, which
asserts that the syntactic signature of any pure graph can be matched by a
faithful semantic signature on its core.
Lemma 5.5. 1. Any arithmetical sentence is univalent.
2. T (φ) is bivalent iﬀ φ is bivalent.
3. ¬φ is bivalent iﬀ φ is bivalent.
4. If φ ∧  is bivalent then one of the following holds
(a) Both φ and  are bivalent,
(b) One of the sentences φ, is bivalent and the other is 1-univalent.
5. If φ ∨  is bivalent then one of the following holds
(a) Both φ and  are bivalent,
(b) One of the sentences φ, is a bivalent and the other is 0-univalent.
6. If ∀xφ is bivalent then one of the following holds
(a) For all n ∈ , φ(n/x) is bivalent,
(b) There is some n ∈  such that φ(n/x) is bivalent and for all m ∈ 
such that φ(m/x) is not bivalent φ(m/x) is 1-univalent.
7. If ∃xφ is bivalent then one of the following holds
(a) For all n ∈ , φ(n/x) is bivalent,
(b) There is some n ∈  such that φ(n/x) is bivalent and for all m ∈ 
such that φ(m/x) is not bivalent φ(m/x) is 0-univalent.
Proof. By Corollary 4.17, a sentence φ is v-univalent iﬀ φ has the truth
value v in the least Cantini ﬁxed point. φ is bivalent iﬀ φ is not in the least
Cantini ﬁxed point. From this all the claims follow straightforwardly. 
Call a nonempty set of factsF mainly positive (mainly negative) iﬀF assigns
value 1 (0) to each bivalent sentence occurring in it. Recall that a set of facts
F is a veriﬁer (falsiﬁer) for φ iﬀ VL(F)(φ) = 1 (VL(F)(φ) = 0). A veriﬁer
(falsiﬁer) is faithful iﬀ for all (, v) ∈ F : if  is u-univalent then v = u.
Lemma 5.6. 1. Every 1-univalent sentence has a faithful and mainly
positive veriﬁer V+ and a faithful and mainly negative veriﬁer V−.
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2. Every 0-univalent sentence has a faithful and mainly negative falsiﬁerF−
and a faithful and mainly positive falsiﬁer F+.
Proof. Let φ be a 1-univalent sentence and let Φ be a set φ depends on.
By Corollary 4.17, VˆL(C+, C−)(φ) = 1, where (C+, C−) is the least ﬁxed
point of VˆL (i.e., the least Cantini ﬁxed point). Let Ψ+ = C+ ∪ (Φ \ C−)
and Ψ− = C−. Then (Ψ+,Ψ−) assigns a positive value to each bivalent
sentence occurring in it, and it assigns to each univalent sentence in it the
right truth value. Moreover, φ depends on Ψ+ ∪ Ψ−. By deﬁnition of VˆL,
VL(Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) = 0.HenceVL(Ψ+,Ψ−)(φ) = 1, i.e., (Ψ+,Ψ−) is a faithful
mainly positive veriﬁer for φ.
The remaining claims are proved in a completely analogous manner. 
A formula is in negation normal form iﬀ it is build from atomic and negated
atomic formulae using ∧,∨, ∀, and ∃ only, without further use of ¬.
Lemma 5.7. Let φ be a bivalent sentence that is in negation normal form.
1. If φ is T -positive then it has a faithful mainly positive veriﬁer V+ and a
faithful mainly negative falsiﬁer F−.
2. If φ is T -negative then it has a faithful mainly negative veriﬁer V− and a
faithful mainly positive falsiﬁer F+.
Proof. By induction on the syntactic complexity of φ.
1. If φ is an arithmetical sentence then the claim holds trivially since φ
is univalent.
2.a) φ ≡ Tt. Then φ depends on {tN}. Then V+ = {(tN, 1)} and F− =
{(tN, 0)} are as desired.
2.b) φ ≡ ¬Tt. Again, φ depends on {tN}. Then V− = {(tN, 0)} and
F+ = {(tN, 1)} are as desired.
3. Let φ ≡ 1 ∧ 2. By Lemma 5.5, one of the following alternatives
holds
3.1. Both1 and2 are bivalent. Let us ﬁrst deal with the case where φ is
T -positive. By induction hypothesis (I.H.) there are V+1 , F−1 for 1
and V+2 ,F−2 for2. Let V+ = V+1 ∪V+2 andF− = F−1 ∪F−2 . Since1
depends on ‖V+1 ‖ and 2 depends on ‖V+2 (by I.H.), φ depends on
‖V+1 ∪ V+2 since V -dependence is weakly compositional (cf. Section
2.4). Hence V+ is a veriﬁer for φ. Similarly for F−.
Now for the case that φ isT -negative. By I.H. there are V−1 ,F+1 for
1 and V−2 ,F+2 for 2. We let V− = V−1 ∪ V−2 and F+ = F+1 ∪ F+2 .
3.2. W.l.o.g. let 1 be bivalent and let 2 be 1-univalent. Again, we start
with the case where φ is T -positive. By I.H., there are V+1 and F−1
for 1. Since 2 is 1-univalent, by Lemma 5.6 there are V+2 , and F−2
for 2. Again, let V+ = V+1 ∪ V+2 and F− = F−1 ∪ V−2 .
Now let φ be T -negative. By I.H., there are V+−1 and F+1 for 1.
Since 2 is 1-univalent, by Lemma 5.6 there are V−2 , and F+2 for 2.
Again, let V− = V−1 ∪ V−2 and F+ = F+1 ∪ V+2 .
4. φ ≡ 1 ∨2. By Lemma 5.5, one of the following alternatives holds
Both 1 and 2 are bivalent, or w.l.o.g. 1 is bivalent and 2 is
0-univalent. Both cases are analogous to Case 3.
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5. φ ≡ ∀x. We only treat the T -positive case, the T -negative is
symmetrical. By Lemma 5.5, one of the following alternatives holds
5.1. For all n ∈ , φx(n) is bivalent. By I.H., for each n there are V+n , F−n
(V−n , F+n ) for φ(n/x). Analogously to 3.1 set V+ =
⋃
n∈ V+n and
F− = ⋃n∈ F−n .
5.2. There is some n ∈  such that φ(n/x) is bivalent and for all
m ∈  such that φ(m/x) is not bivalent, φ(m/x) is 1-univalent.
Completely analogous we deﬁne V+ = (⋃n∈B V+n )∪ (⋃n∈U V+n ) and
F− = (⋃n∈B F−n )∪ (⋃n∈U V−n ), where B is the set of all n ∈  such
that φ(n/x) is bivalent while U is the set of all n ∈  such that
φ(n/x) is univalent. 
The following result shows that Lemma 5.7 holds for all bivalent sentences,
not just those in negation normal form. The result relies on particular prop-
erties of VL that do not follow automatically from its being a standard
symmetric valuation scheme with a weakly compositional dependence rela-
tion. Hence, themain theoremof this section can only be transferred to other
valuation schemes if they allow for a corresponding normal form theorem.
Lemma 5.8. For every φ ∈ LT there is a φ′ ∈ LT such that
1. φ′ is in negation normal form;
2. VL(S+;S−)(φ) = VL(S+, S−)(φ′), for all S+, S−; and
3. φ, φ′ depend on the same sets of sentences.
Hence, Lemma 5.7 holds for all bivalent sentences.
Proof. Let φ be given. Using some standard transformation rules we can
obtain a negation normal formula φ′ that is classically equivalent to φ and
has the same atomic formulae as φ. This implies that (2) and (3) hold. 
Theorem 5.9. Let G be a mainly pure graph. Then G admits a faithful
semantic signature that matches its syntactic signature on the core-graph ofG .
Proof. Let G be a mainly pure rfg of some sentence φ and let 
 be the
strategy induced by its unfolding. We recursively deﬁne a strategy 
∗ for (∃)
in the game GT (φ, v), where v = 1 if φ is 1-univalent or bivalent, and v = 0
if 0-univalent. The semantic signature induced by 
∗ will be as desired. For
any node  of G , let outG() be the set that of out-neighbours of  in G .
Let n be (∀)’s n-th move and vn be the mode of the game of this move. We
deﬁne
Case 1. n is T -positive.
If n is some sentence in the core of G , let (∃)’s answer be
Fn =
{
V+(n) ∩ outG(n), if vn = 1,
F−(n) ∩ outG(n), if vn = 0.
where V+(n) (F−(n)) is the faithful and mainly positive veriﬁer (the
faithful and mainly negative falsiﬁer) given by Lemma 5.7.
Now suppose n is in the periphery of G and 1-univalent. If n = 1 then
vn = 1 by assumption. If n > 1 then also vn = 1, since by induction
hypothesis, Fn is a faithful set of facts. Let (∃)’s answer be
Fn = V+(n) ∩ outG(n).
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This is a legal move and a faithful set of facts, where the existence of the
faithful and mainly positive veriﬁer V+(n) is given by Lemma 5.6.
Suppose n is in the periphery of G and 0-univalent. Then vn = 0 by the
same argument as in the previous case. Let (∃)’s answer be
Fn = F−(n) ∩ outG(n).
Again, this is a legal move and a faithful set of facts, where the existence of
the faithful and mainly negative falsiﬁer F−(n) is given by Lemma 5.6.
Case 2. n is T -negative.
If n is some sentence in the core of G , let (∃)’s answer be
Fn =
{
V−(n) ∩ outG(n), if vn = 1,
F+(n) ∩ outG(n), if vn = 0.
where F+(n) (V−(n)) is the faithful and mainly positive falsiﬁer (the
faithful and mainly negative veriﬁer) given by Lemma 5.7.
Now suppose n in the periphery of G and 1-univalent. Then vn = 1. Let
(∃)’s answer be Fn = V−(n) ∩ outG(n). If n is 0-univalent then vn = 1.
Let (∃)’s answer be Fn = F+(n) ∩ outG(n).
Then 
∗ a is faithful strategy and a decoration of 
. Let S be the signature
induced by 
∗ onG . Then by construction S matches the syntactic signature
of G on its core-graph. (Observe that by collapsing 
∗ to G , no ⊥ will
arise because in the syntactic signature the label of an arc depends only on
its tail). 
The following theorem is the ‘signed’ variant of Corollary 4.30.
Corollary 5.10. Let G be a pure rfg. If the core-graph of G has only
cycles and double paths with an even number of negative arcs then G has an
acceptable decoration.
Proof. This follows from Theorems 5.4 and 5.9. 
Corollary 5.11. Every mainly positive rfg has an acceptable decoration.
Corollary 5.12. Every mainly negative rfg whose core-graph has only
cycles and double paths with an even number of negative arcs has an acceptable
decoration.
5.3. F-systems. A special case of rfgs with a syntactic signature that has
attracted some attention in the literature is what Rabern et al. [16] call
F -systems (F standing for False): each sentence in such a system claims
that all the sentences it is referring to are false. The interest in F -systems
is understandable, since many of the classical paradoxes like the Liar or
Yablo’s paradox are of this form. F -systems are the subject of Cook [5],
where he establishes a correspondence between the acceptable decorations
of an F -system and the kernels of its graph: this is interesting because
graph kernels have been investigated quite systematically by graph theorists
and any results, e.g., on necessary or suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of a kernel are straightforwardly translated into results on conditions for
the (non)paradoxicality of F -systems via Cook’s correspondence. Our own
deﬁnition of an F -system is a generalized version of Rabern et al.’s version
of Cook’s framework: We drop the requirement that the graphs must be
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sink free, which allows us, for example, to analyse also Curry-like paradoxes
within this framework and thus to apply the theory of graph kernels to them.
Definition 5.13. Let G be a canonical rfg. We call G an F-system iﬀ for
all vertices  of G the following holds
1. If  is a not a sink of G then  ≡ ∀x(φ → ¬Tx), where φ is a T -free
formula.
2. If  is a sink of G then  is a true arithmetical sentence.
Recall that a sentence of the form ∀x(φ → ¬Tx), where φ isT -free, depends
on the set {n |N |= φ(n)}, and in fact essentially so (cf. Section 2.3). This will
be used frequently in the proof of the theorem below. However, this means
that the results in the present section cannot automatically be transferred to
other valuation schemes, since the property in question does not follow from
weak compositionality alone. A particularly odd case is given by the Weak
Kleene scheme—it is easy to see that there are no (nontrivial) F -systems for
the Weak Kleene scheme, where a nontrivial F -system is one that contains
at least one node that is not a sink. The reason is that under this scheme,
any sentence of the form ∀x(φ → ¬Tx) will VWK -depend on the set of
all sentences because of the strong compositionality of Weak Kleene. The
theorem below will therefore hold trivially.
Definition 5.14. Let G be a graph. K ⊆ G is called a kernel of G iﬀ
1. All elements of K are independent in G , i.e., G has no arc a such that
both the head of a and the tail of a are elements of K .
2. For all x ∈ V (G) \K there is a y ∈ K such that there is a G-arc from
x to y.
Cook’s correspondence theorem carries over straightforwardly:
Theorem 5.15. LetG be an F-system. Then there is a bijection between the
set of the kernels of G and the set of the acceptable decorations of G .
Proof. LetK be a kernel ofG . Deﬁne dK : V (G)→ {0, 1} by dK () = 1
if  ∈ K and dK () = 0 if  /∈ K . We have to show that dK is acceptable,
i.e., that for all vertices  of G the following holds
VL(Ψ+d ,Ψ
−
d )() = d (),
where Ψ+d = {	 ∈ Ψ |dK (	) = 1}, Ψ−d = {	 ∈ Ψ |dK (	) = 0} and Ψ is the
set of all out-neighbours of  in G .
Suppose that dK () = 1. Then  ∈ K and thus (since K is a kernel)
for all 	 ∈ Ψ : dK (	) = 0. Hence VL(Ψ+d ,Ψ−d )() = VL(∅,Ψ)() =
Val∅(∀x(φ → ¬Tx)) = 1.
Now suppose that dK () = 0. Then  /∈ K . Hence there is some 	 ∈ K
with 	 ∈ Ψ. Thus dK (	) = 1 andΨ+d = ∅. SinceG is canonical, 	 cannot be
arithmetical (i.e., is not a sink of G), hence  ≡ ∀x(φ → ¬Tx). Therefore
VL(Ψ+d ,Ψ
−
d )() = ValΨ+d (∀x(φ → ¬Tx)). But  depends essentially on
{n ∈  |N |= φ(n)} and by assumption also essentially on Ψ. This means
Ψ = {n ∈  |N |= φ(n)}. Hence (N,Ψ+d ) |= φ(	) and (N,Ψ+d ) |= T (	).
Hence ValΨ+d (∀x(φ → ¬Tx)) = 0 = dK (). Thus, dK is an acceptable
decoration of G .
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Clearly, the map h is injective. To show that h is also surjective, let d be
any acceptable decoration of G . Let K = { ∈ V (G) |d () = 1}. We have
to show that K is a kernel. Let , 	 ∈ V (G). If 	 is an out-neighbour of 
then  ≡ ∀x(φ → ¬Tx). Suppose that d (	) = 1. Then d () = 0 by the
same argument as above. Hence any two vertices of K are independent.
Now suppose that  ∈ V (G) \K . Then d () = 0. Since d is acceptable,
 cannot be arithmetical. Hence is not a sink and ≡ ∀x(φ → ¬Tx). Let
Ψ be the set of all out-neighbours of . Since d is an acceptable decoration
and Ψ = {n ∈  |N |= φ(n)}, there is some 	 ∈ Ψ such that d (	) = 1,
hence 	 ∈ K . 
§6. Appendix: The concept of finitaryminor. The purpose of this appendix
is to deﬁne and motivate the concept of a minor used in the conjecture in
Section 4.5. In order to do so, let us ﬁrst have a look at the notion of a minor
for undirected graphs and try to grasp the basic intuition behind it. Then, in
a second step, we will deﬁne a concept of minor for directed graphs in such a
way that this basic intuition carries over. Intuitively speaking, an undirected
graph G contains an undirected graph H as minor iﬀ H is isomorphic to
a graph H ′ that results from G by some kind of simpliﬁcation operations
which allow to (i) delete arbitrary edges of G and (ii) contract connected
subgraphs of G to single nodes. We call an undirected graph G connected
iﬀ for each x, y ∈ V (G) there is a path in G with end vertices x and y. In
the following let G andH be undirected and simple (i.e., loop-free) graphs.
We denote by E(G) the set of the edges of G . The crucial concept in the
deﬁnition of the minor relation between undirected graphs is that of an
inﬂation (cf. [7]).
Definition 6.1. An undirected graph G is an inﬂation of an undirected
graphH ifV (G) admits a partition {Vx |x ∈ V (H )} such that the following
conditions hold
1. for all x = y ∈ V (H ), (x, y) ∈ E(H ) iﬀ there is some e ∈ E(G)
connecting a vertex in Vx and a vertex in Vy .
2. for all x ∈ V (H ), G [Vx] is connected.
The notion of an inﬂation gives rise to a graph homomorphism f : G →
H contracting the inﬂation G to H . Let f : V (G) → V (H ) deﬁned by
f(x) = y iﬀ x ∈ Vy (where Vy is the component associated to y ∈ V (H )
in the partition of V (G)). Then f is a graph homomorphism between simple
undirected graphs i.e., a surjective map such that (i) (x, y) ∈ E(G) implies
that (f(x), f(y)) ∈ E(H ) or f(x) = f(y) and (ii) (x′, y′) ∈ E(H )
implies that there are x, y ∈ V (G) such that x′ = f(x) and y′ = f(y).
Moreover, due to condition (2) in the deﬁnition of inﬂation, f has the
following property.
Definition 6.2. A graph homomorphism f : G → H between simple
undirected graphs has the path lifting property iﬀ for each path p′ joining x′
and y′ in H there are x, y ∈ V (G) and a path p joining x and y in G such
that f(x) = x′ and f(y) = y′ and f(z) ∈ V (p′) for all z ∈ V (p).
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Loosely speaking, the path lifting property ensures that the image H of G
under the contracting map can be used as a road map for the ‘real world’ G :
whenever a road map shows a road p′ leading from x′ to y′ you want to be
sure that there is a real road p that corresponds to p′.
Definition 6.3. An undirected graph G is a minor of H iﬀ there is some
H ′ ⊆ H such that H ′ is an inﬂation of G .
So everyminor ofH is a ‘roadmap’ of some subgraph ofH . In this sense, the
minor relation can be seen as a more liberal form of the subgraph relation,
allowing in addition the subgraph to be shrinked down. Or, in other words:
that a graph G is contained in H as a minor means that G is ‘hidden’ in H
and can be made visible by drawing a suitable road map of a region ofH .
In the theory of undirected graphs the concept of minor is certainly one
of the most fruitful among graph-theoretic concepts. There is an abundance
of so-called excluded-minor characterizations of various graph-theoretic
properties (cf. Diestel [7, Chapter 4].) However, switching from undirected
to directed graphs, there is some problem in the minor-deﬁnition to be dealt
with: the concept of connectedness has more than one counterpart when
it comes to digraphs (e.g., weak connectedness, strong connectedness). But
having isolated the path lifting property as the crucial point, it should be
clear how to choose the right notion of connectedness.
Definition 6.4. Call a digraph G a ﬁnitary inﬂation of a digraph H if
V (G) admits a partition{Vx |x ∈ V (H )} such that the following conditions
hold
1. for all x, y ∈ V (H ):
(a) if x = y then (x, y) ∈ A(H ) iﬀ there is some a ∈ A(G) with tail
in Vx and head in Vy ,
(b) if x = y then (x, y) /∈ A(H ).
2. for all x ∈ A(H ) and all y, z ∈ Vx: if y has an in-neighbour in
V (G) \ Vx and z has an out-neighbour in V (G) \ Vx then there is a
path P ⊆ G [Vx] from y to z.
3. for all x ∈ V (H ), Vx is ﬁnite.
Definition 6.5. A digraph G is a ﬁnitary minor of H (we also say H
contains G as a ﬁnitary minor) iﬀ there is some H ′ ⊆ H such that H ′ is a
ﬁnitary inﬂation of G .
In analogy to the undirected case we get a map f : V (G)→ V (H ) deﬁned
by f(x) = y iﬀ x ∈ Vy (where Vy is a the component associated to
y ∈ V (H ) of the partition of V (G)). Then f is a digraph homomorphism
mapping digraphs to loop-free digraphs, i.e., a surjective map such that (i)
(x, y) ∈ A(G) implies that (f(x), f(y)) ∈ A(H ) or f(x) = f(y) and (ii)
(x′, y′) ∈ A(H ) implies that there are x, y ∈ V (G) such that x′ = f(x)
and y′ = f(y).
Observe that condition 1(b) ensures that no digraph G can be an inﬂation
of a digraphH that contains a loop. This implies in particular that the ‘inner
arcs’ of a component Vx , i.e., the arcs ofG [Vx] are not contracted to a loop
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by applying the contraction homomorphism f, but simply disappear. Thus
f is not a danger preserving operation in the sense of Rabern et al., i.e., an
operation that maps dangerous graphs to dangerous graphs. The reason for
this clause is a simple technical one: allowing ‘inner arcs’ to be contracted
to a loop would lead to new artiﬁcial loops as a product of the operation of
contraction. Since the Yablo graph does not contain any loops, it cannot be
the result of a nontrivial contraction and thus our conjecture would turn out
trivially false. The fact that, given our deﬁnition of inﬂation (contraction),
even existing cycles of a component G [Vx] are eliminated, should not pose
any problem for our purposes. If a graph contains a loop it is dangerous
anyway; the unsolved part of the characterization problem concerns only
acyclic graphs and only for these has the operation of contraction to turn out
as danger preserving. The second condition in the above deﬁnition ensures
that f satisﬁes the following property:
Definition 6.6. A graph homomorphism f : G → H from digraphs to
loop-free digraphs has the path lifting property iﬀ for each path p′ fom x′
to y′ in H there are x, y ∈ V (G) and a path p from x to y in G such that
f(x) = x′ and f(y) = y′ and f(z) ∈ V (p′) for all z ∈ V (p).
The third condition is added because we want, as mentioned above, a con-
traction to be a danger preserving operation on acyclic graphs. In the
following illustration, the second graph is a (ﬁnitary) contraction of the
ﬁrst one.
X1 Y
′
1 X2 Y
′
2 X3 Y
′
3
...
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 ...
Hence the second graph is a ﬁnitary minor of the ﬁrst. As shown by Rabern
et al. the ﬁrst graph is dangerous while it does not contain a subdivision of
the Yablo graph. This illustrates that the minor concept is more liberal than
the concept of subdivision, as it captures more dangerous graphs.
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